There is often some very good reading over at www.airliners.net inside their civil aviation forum with some very good commenters and very interesting threads to follow. This week, one asked: “United/Continental Conceding Domestic Market?” Another speculated about the future of the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA). Another asked which is the next US carrier to file for bankruptcy? That speculation is rightfully focused on the regional sector of the industry. But much of the discussion fails to recognize the tangled web called the domestic network business, which includes mainline carriers, regional carriers and the unions. The players in this web are inextricably intertwined - but too often discussed in silos.
United-Continental Holdings’ CEO Jeff Smisek once said something I now quote in every presentation I make. Of the world’s now largest airline, he said: “We’ll have the domestic operations sized solely to feed the international traffic.” That quote and its derivatives are sprinkled throughout the airliners.net thread focusing on whether United/Continental is conceding the domestic market.
In my view, the US domestic business is at a crossroads. Do iconic names like United, Delta, American and US Airways continue to make pure domestic flying a significant portion of their route portfolio, or do they continue to attrite pure domestic operations away because cost structures can no longer support mainline flying in what has become an ultra low fare market?
Some in the thread note that Smisek’s words worry some pilots, as they should. And those concerns shouldn’t be limited to the flight deck. In a ‘be careful what you ask’ for scenario, there are forces at work that ensure the regional sector of the business as we know it today will be smaller tomorrow.
There is a virtuous circle of events at play: with in the wing oil in excess of $100 per barrel; no 50 seat and less replacement aircraft in the pipeline; regional flying under contract that won’t be renewed because of economics; the prevalence of low cost carriers in the primary and secondary catchment areas of small and non hub airport markets; a pilot shortage that will impact the regional sector; flight time/duty time regulations that will require more regional pilots to perform the same level of flying being performed today; a new law requiring 1500 hours of flying for new pilots; and the fact that the smallest aircraft coming to market will be at least 100 seats.
And so the circle spirals downward for the regional sector of the business.
I think scope is a cancer because it has been used as a bargaining chip. It has been, and is, a Ponzi scheme as I wrote in US Pilot Unions’ Dirty Little Secrets. There has been a B-Scale in place supporting the rich mainline contracts since 1984 when new hires were offered positions at lower rates of pay. When it was deemed wrong for unions to do such a thing, regional airline code sharing relationships were formed. This “outsourcing” was agreed to by the union in return for higher wages and benefits for incumbent mainline pilots.
After my last two posts on scope I expected, and received a lot of interesting mail. Much of it emotional but some as ugly as the commentator who suggested “a certain poetic irony to the image of you[Swelbar] in a smokin' hole and another Captain Renslow at the controls. Be careful what you ask for.”
Now it is my turn to say: Be careful what you ask for. If no B-Scale for domestic flying is possible and a phasing out of regional jobs is the goal in this round of negotiations, then what is going to cross-subsidize the wages, benefits and work rules at the mainline? By my calculation then, there is even less money to go around to for mainline pilots to win in a new contract. And with the loss of feed traffic from a smaller regional sector, the real question is just how many mainline narrowbody aircraft does a carrier need? In a point-to-point world, the answer is a whole lot less. If 14,000 mainline pilot jobs were lost in a decade of downsizing then more job losses are on the way from a loss of feed. And the effects of a pilot shortage are even less.
And so the virtuous circle spirals downward for the mainline sector of the business.
Commenting on a Commenter
I received the following private email from John, which encompasses the views of many other commenters (public and private). He writes:
I read your blog because I know management does, I’m not your biggest fan. However, I would like to see your opinion on the consolidation of regional carriers. To me, scope is synonymous with outsourcing, which you say allows for flexibility. But the real advantage of outsourcing is the low cost entry into markets (and exit).
Things have changed, wouldn’t you agree? Cash strapped regional airline are a thing of the past because consolidation has honed the market down to three: Republic, Skywest, and Pinnacle. With size came assets, more loan opportunities, and market dominance. In my opinion, I believe that regional airlines have reached a size where they have serious power over code sharing agreements or have the option to go many markets alone, Skywest is already considered a major airline with a MC of $6B.
I know you love to blame labor, because your audience isn’t. I understand you have to make a living, and the ATA may not want to hear this, but they are screwing up. The majors better start thinking of in-sourcing or face another round of upstart airlines entering the market with low cost structure and plenty of established routes thanks to the majors giving them business.
After all, outsourcing worked so well on the 787 it aught to do equally well for the airlines…right?
For the record, I do not see scope as outsourcing as it was agreed by both parties that a certain number of smaller jets can be used within the domestic system carrying a certain airline code. After all, the mainline pilots did not want to be bothered with those little jets. As for John, the real advantage of deploying small jets under the airline code is to maintain presence in feed markets that the mainline cost structure could no longer support. Mainline aircraft in markets like Charleston, WV is a thing of the bygone years that immediately followed deregulation, yet they unfortunately still comprise a disproportionate size of the memory bank called entitlement.
Yes, things have changed and are changing. There are haves and have nots within the regional industry today as there were in mainline industry of yesterday. There is one airline, SkyWest, which stands alone in the industry because of stellar management that understands the carrier’s place in the industry and their role in building a balance sheet that ensures Skywest will be part of the discussion for years to come. While I am sure that SkyWest would love to have a market capitalization of $6 billion that you make fact – on Friday the market capitalization of SkyWest was less than $650 million.
To make a valid argument, John would need to produce economics at the mainline that allow the company to serve Ft. Wayne, Indiana with non-regional (77 seats and more) equipment. And my guess is that he could not. How many of those 737s/A320s/MD80s are filled with traffic coming from 50 and 70 seat jets? How could he produce the same economics on the flying without having to make wholesale changes to his existing collective bargaining agreement in order to keep the flying in house?
I get this argument often from other commenters that look back before looking ahead. Yes you can bring the flying in house - but not until the terms of the collective bargaining agreement reflect the B-Scale terms and conditions the mainline pilots found, and find, appropriate for their regional brothers and sisters.
Many claim I am too quick to blame labor. In this case, it is the unions that create this purported “outsourcing” to support bloated mainline salaries, benefits and work rules.
John is right in his comment that “the majors better start thinking of in-sourcing or face another round of upstart airlines entering the market with low cost structure and plenty of established routes thanks to the majors giving them business” -- at least on one front. Today, the use of the regional industry is a defensive weapon used by networks to curb encroachment into mainline markets. By forcing regional carriers to fly fewer 76-seat aircraft and less as well as limit their ability to fly anything bigger (again assuming the pilot unions would not change their collective bargaining agreements to meet or exceed the terms available from the regional provider), any airline network will begin to vacate certain markets that may then become an opportunity for a start up or an inroad for an incumbent like Southwest or jetBlue.
Scope is as much as regulator of the business as is government at a time this industry does not need any more regulation. Regulation often results in unintended consequences, one of which will be to create market vacuums that an upstart might willingly fill. Nature abhors a vacuum.
And John and many of his fellow mainline pilots end up over-regulating the business of feeding the aircraft they fly. No feed – assuming that airlines cannot get to the right economics to fly certain routes – will likely result in significantly less mainline narrowbody flying – perhaps just enough to support the international operation. And that may not be the consequence that mainline pilots have intended.