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Entries in jetblue Airways (3)

Wednesday
Mar312010

Pondering American and jetBlue: Most Interesting

Coming on the heels of last week's post about Southwest and being jilted by Delta and US Airways in their reworked slot exchange, this morning we get an announcement that American and jetBlue are entering into a new commercial arrangement at key east coast cities.  I will probably write later on the topic but wanted to jot a few things down before I leave for meetings.

  • Each SkyTeam and STAR have enhanced their positions in the New York metro market in recent months.  Given the importance of New York and the key east coast cities of New York and Boston, American enhances its presence as well as that of oneworld with this announcement. 
  • jetBlue has a relationship with Aer Lingus.  Lufthansa invested in jetBlue.  Now jetBlue enters into a commercial relationship with American whereby customers of each airline can enjoy interline capabilities with the other at each Boston Logan and New York JFK on non-overlapping routes.
  • Is jetBlue becoming the Alaska Airlines of the east coast?  Keeping itself most relevant in its home market by code sharing with many airlines? 
  • American intends to transfer eight slot pairs at Ronald Reagan National Airport and one slot pair at White Plains N.Y. to jetBlue.  Three more than jetBlue would receive in the DL-US proposed transaction.  So for jetBlue, will it be 5, 8 or 13 slot pairs at Ronald Reagan National Airport? 
  • jetBlue intends to transfer 12 slot pairs at JFK to American.
  • This slot transfer business is getting very interesting.
  • It has been a bad week for Southwest.  Between their cry of being "left out" of the US - DL slot swap; talk of being jilted by WestJet; and now American teaming with jetBlue .......

I wonder what Southwest must be thinking?

 

Tuesday
Jul282009

Propagating Harm: Senators Boxer and Snowe; and Kate Hanni

The festering issue of whether to enact a Passenger Bill of Rights is on its most aggressive track, both publicly and in Congress. Last week the Senate Commerce Committee approved its version of the FAA Reauthorization Bill. Tucked inside was the Boxer-Snowe amendment, which resurrects the Airline Passenger Bill of Rights nearly two years after it first reared its ugly head on Capitol Hill.

Among other things, the Boxer-Snowe version requires airlines to let passengers off of an aircraft that is delayed on the tarmac for three hours or more.

I ask, is this really a cause for Congress? Is this “issue” worthy of all the angst we see in articles like in the USA Today, which is to my eye drafted to drum up controversy replete with anecdotes and devoid of the relationship to the sheer number of flights consumers enjoy.

It is anecdotal and emotion driven by a populist appeal that seems to be driving this debate. With the airline industry already in fierce competition for customers and revenue, my bet is that the industry is more than capable of addressing this issue on its own as evidenced in the recent focus on operational results. But Congress too often seeks a legislative solution where the private sector should prevail, as we’ve seen before and will unfortunately see again. And in these cases, it is clear that the law of unintended consequences is alive and well.

At MIT, I am fortunate to work with learned academics and industry experts who produce a volume of impressive research on airline operations and performance and schedule recovery. Among it is some interesting data that shows airline schedule planning may actually propagate the kind of air travel delays that has some in Congress pushing bills that very likely will add to, and not ameliorate the problem.

Professor Amy Cohn of the University of Michigan is a Sloan Industry Studies Fellow researching the passenger airline industry. Her research illustrates that plans that look good on paper often do not perform well in practice. Cohn argues that, with the complex nature of airline networks, a little “slack” built into the schedule actually improves performance – but offsets the benefits of system optimization. Much good work has been done to make this capital and labor intensive industry as efficient as it can be, particularly given the many variables that affect performance – from a crew member calling in sick, to a mechanical problem, to a geopolitical event, or to the weather.

Consumer Benefits of Airline Schedules Have Been Significant

Schedule planning has provided a wide range of benefits – primarily for consumers. Over the past 20 years, passengers have seen connecting times fall significantly – which is particularly important to those who do not live in hub cities and face a combination of flights to get to their desired destinations. This opaque airline practice has resulted in more productive time for the airline passenger. It has helped to make airlines significantly more efficient because time saved on the ground translates into money saved for the airline. These cost savings have also been passed along to consumers in the form of lower fares

In addition, schedule optimization has permitted added frequencies to non-stop destinations, providing consumers a wider array of departure times and, in some instances, a wider choice in carriers and hubs.

All Anecdotes, Few Facts and Little Analysis

Federal legislation like the Passenger Bill of Rights proposal could significantly undo the progress the airline industry has made. And the real shame is that the legislation borne of one unfortunate delay and an angry but media darling passenger activist named Kate Hanni is the product of anecdotal, and often unsubstantiated evidence rather than serious analysis. Anecdotes produce sensationalist stories like the one in the USA Today. But real research tells a different story. According to the Air Transport Association and the US Bureau of Transportation Statistics, all but one of the airline efficiency metrics are at their best levels since 2000, including flight cancellations as a percent of domestic departures, on- time arrival rates, mishandled bags, customer complaints, and taxi-out times in excess of three hours.

So why the focus on an arbitrary three hour time limit? Why not two hours? Why not three hours and 17 minutes? As it is, the legislation now in Congress is designed to affect no more than .014 (1q’09 according to ATA) percent of domestic passengers. Of that small subset of passengers, who, if anyone will actually benefit from the legislation? Well that depends on how many of those passengers would rather wait a little while more in hopes of getting clearance to take off, and how many would prefer to return to the gate and call it a night and risk the ultimate arrival. Now I will add that in order to wait out a delay, there is a rightful expectation of a fully functioning aircraft and onboard amenities that allow a bearable experience.

Who Wins?

The truth is, you can’t legislate smooth travel conditions. Weather is a reality and weather causes delays. And yes, delays add to the angst of travel and wets the appetites of those in the media that thrive on the travails of travel. In those cases of severe weather and flight irregularities, some fliers may be happy just to wait out the delay if it means getting to their destination. A return to the terminal, after all, just adds to the chaos for later flights as the airline struggles to get crews on planes and passengers on their way. And the issues propagate. Imagine the mood on a plane queued to take off following a weather delay if the pilot suddenly announces that they are headed back to the terminal because Congress says they have to. Whose “rights” does that protect?

What Does This Have to Do With Reauthorization?

Of the .014 percent, or the .01 percent of domestic departures during the first quarter of 2009, of domestic passengers impacted by tarmac delays greater than three hours, shouldn’t we also be asking how many of those delays could possibly be laid at the feet of Congress and the government because they did not keep their promise of upgrading the air traffic control system? That’s a legislative solution that would benefit all airline passengers, every community and the industry itself. Whereas the USA Today article was largely sensationalistic with its statistical story and included vignettes about crying babies and the like, at least the reporter talked to an airline and a knowledgeable consultant about the old and inefficient air traffic control system.

The USA Today article rightly makes this case. "Because of the antiquated air-traffic-control system in which we — and every airline — operate, we're restricted as to the operational improvements we can make," Bryan Baldwin, spokesman for JetBlue Airways, told the newspaper

Aviation consultant Michael Boyd said airline CEOs "should form a conga line" to the FAA and demand the country's air-traffic system be modernized. That could increase airspace capacity and reduce the number of waiting planes.

That alone would do far more to reduce congestion and delay than would a phony and likely counterproductive passenger “bill of rights.”

Don’t get me wrong. The airlines deserve some blame here. We would not be facing the prospect of such a ludicrous proposal if the airlines did not fail their passengers and fail them more than once. But remember, they do operate nearly seven million flights per year - significantly more than when competition was born. Their failures pale in comparison. Passengers could, and have, experience serious repercussions from a prolonged wait on the tarmac – whether from lack of food, water, medicine or simply the need to get off the plane and attend to personal matters. But that is an issue that can be solved with a directive, a renewed focus on customer service and basic human comforts, not a piece of legislation that certainly will result in unintended consequences. Airlines and airports are making progress on that front and addressing delays that they can control. But last I checked, weather was not among them.

This issue needs study – a very detailed study – and it sure as hell is not the 2008 ARC study - on the issues . There is a solid foundation of scholarly work to build on and adapt that work to this particular issue. Those that perform the study need to understand how airline operations work and then determine how an airline can best address the anecdotes (outlier events) given the unique constraints placed on airlines, airports and the air traffic system each and every day as there is no one size fits all solution that seems to be called for in the ill advised Boxer-Snowe legislation.

The real issue is in the root cause of airline delays, and the answer will be found to incubate in the air traffic control system. The FAA reauthorization bill comes around only once every so many years. Is Congress going to use this opportunity to pass a meaningless “protection” for a few passengers, or take a bold step and do what it takes to build a better air traffic control system for the good of all?

I thought the administration was going to take parochial interests out of legislation. This legislation should be about funding the FAA in order to modernize the air traffic system and increase its safety – not tarmac delays; not propping up a non-essential Essential Air Service program; and certainly not about anti-trust immunity.

More to come on these issues.

 

The next post will examine the baseline of pay and productivity issues the airlines face as labor seeks to return compensation lost from past negotiations.

Tuesday
Jun302009

Neither Ponzi nor Pyramid, but an End Game Nonetheless?

Liquidations and/or Use of the Failing Carrier Doctrine?

On the day when Bernie Madoff gets sentenced to 150 years for orchestrating the financial fleecing scheme that put its namesake, Charles Ponzi, to shame, I am pondering the balance sheets of airlines. And it comes down to this: some carriers have little room to maneuver. Investors (read: credit) are not lining up to provide new capital without demanding ransom in terms of collateral or sky-high coupon rates well above those paid in other industries.

Ponzi and pyramid schemes work by gathering proceeds from one group of investors to pay off earlier investors. It is no small irony, then, that much the same has been happening in the airline industry for years. The financial scams fall apart when they run out of money to pay new investors. In airlines, the end result is pretty much the same. Airlines continue to seek new capital even as previous investors fail to earn a respectable return on their investment. It’s not illegal, but neither is it sustainable. Indeed, it is fast becoming apparent that capital is quickly tiring of this industry and its inability to sustain profits, return its cost of capital and thus reinvest in itself at market rates.

In an industry that has succeeded mainly in destroying decades of capital, the end game for some airlines may be near. To inject new funds into its operation, United Airlines’ required collateral was reportedly three times the $175 million in cash it raised. More troubling yet -- the coupon rate on the new debt was 12.75 percent. Even with exorbitant collateral demands and above-market interest rates, new investors were willing to pay only 90 cents on the dollar for the security, which equates to an effective return to the investor closer to 17 percent.

At the same time, American announced it will sell $520.1 million in debt . American’s collateral requirements will be hefty, but slightly less than twice the amount it plans to raise. According to the Associated Press, American’s debt is investment grade based in part on the assets pledged as collateral. Therefore, American will pay significantly less for its capital than will United, even if the investor interest level is on par. But with corporations of this size, and of this importance to the US economy, “investment grade” ought to be the baseline, not the high bar. That’s not the case today. Earlier in the year, Southwest -- the industry’s only capital-worthy airline -- was forced to pay in excess of 10 percent on its loans. Wow. In other circumstances, that might be considered usury.

 

Data Points

Market perceptions, and cold, hard cash, demonstrate a new industry pecking order is emerging. Allegiant, AirTran, Alaska and SkyWest – airlines many Americans have never flown -- each today have a market capitalization greater than that of either United or US Airways.

In Spring 2009, Fitch’s Airline Credit Navigator outlined current liquidity and expected debt maturities for airlines over the next three years. It found “most of the biggest U.S. airlines ended the first quarter in "unfavorable liquidity positions.”

For three of the top seven carriers (US Airways, American and United), this liquidity ratio fell below 15 percent of trailing twelve month revenues - a benchmark commonly used to target an optimal amount of cash to be held on the balance sheet.

According to Fitch’s data, American, Continental, Delta, United, US Airways, Southwest and jetBlue held nearly $17 billion in liquidity at the end of the first quarter of 2009 (and with a market capitalization of $13.7 billion for the same group of carriers, the market says that a dollar today is not a dollar tomorrow). Southwest and Delta constitute two-thirds of the group’s market capitalization.

Assets are only one part of the disturbing picture the Fitch data paints. The other half is liabilities. Together, the carriers have debt obligations of nearly $12 billion due by the end of 2010. And these obligations come at a time where negative free cash flows are anticipated for the foreseeable future.

Take as one example Delta, which claimed title as the world’s largest airline following its merger with Northwest. While in the first quarter of this year Delta did not fall below Fitch’s relatively arbitrary liquidity rating. Fitch nonetheless downgraded the debt ratings of Delta and Northwest on June 25 to reflect “intense revenue pressure” and expected negative cash flows. As a result of its combined balance sheet with Northwest, Delta has a stronger absolute cash balance relative to the industry, but still faces nearly $5 billion of fixed debt obligations through 2011.

The shift of capacity by the U.S .legacy carriers to international markets has suffered from poor timing. For United, its exposure to once lucrative trans-Pacific markets is even more painful as the geographic region is closest to intensive care. By comparison, American and US Airways are fortunate to have little relative exposure in the Pacific. But the winner is likely the new Delta which, with lots of eggs in all international baskets. This diversification will certainly produce better results than either Northwest or Delta would have achieved individually.

 

Renewed Consolidation Focus Based on an Old Tool?

In prior eras, the airline industry has relied on the “failing carrier doctrine” to combine companies on the verge of collapse or unable to meet debt obligations. That doctrine might be dusted off and used again during the next 12 months. Precedent shows mergers and acquisitions are viewed more favorably – with fewer concerns about competition – when the economy is in a swoon and airlines are at greater risk of going under.

US Airways chief Doug Parker is not alone in making a case for consolidation. United’s Glenn Tilton is also in the chorus. Both carriers are on Fitch’s list of those in the “liquidity danger zone.” United and US Airways still have some room to maneuver, but recent attempts to raise capital have proven, in the airline industry particularly, money is getting increasingly expensive.

We may be entering a new era in which the “failing carrier doctrine” no longer applies. Instead, we are now facing the “failing industry doctrine.”

On Second Thought

One of the big issues related to mergers not discussed enough is the preservation of the tax loss carry forwards that each airline has accrued (accrued losses can be used to offset profits in future years). So in the short to medium term, the industry may resist the urge to merge because a change of control could or would have significant tax ramifications. If this is the case, why not apply the failing carrier doctrine to anti-trust immunity?

First, there is no doubt we will see additional capacity cuts, with the next round showing up in the schedules for fall of 2009. This industry is not shrinking because it wants to, but rather because it has to. By the time airlines cut further at the end of the summer travel season, the industry’s two decades of economics-be-damned growth may be nothing but a memory of bad decisions gone by. Then the U.S. airline industry can finally get down to the business of being a business. Or be resigned to failure.

As I have written time and again, in this economy, capital will determine the survivors. Access to capital is the lifeline airlines need now. Those who control that capital are sending a message to legacy carriers, and that is they will pay dearly for funding until they can demonstrate a sufficient return for investors.

 

Republic Airways Holdings, Inc.

Recognizing the importance of that lifeline might shape the airline industry of the future. Republic Airways CEO Bryan Bedford seems to already be moving that way. As a result of his purchase of Midwest, Bedford now has investment firm TPG on his board - - basically, capital now in is the role of decision maker.

Whether other carriers can accept that kind of change might very well decide the future of the industry and whether some airlines even survive. Right now, that future for many airlines and the hundreds of thousands of people they employ is anything but bright.

Keep in mind, the next industry shakeout is not reserved for the big players alone. Look for entities other than the five legacy carriers (American, Continental, Delta, United and US Airways) to have input into any new architectural renderings of network structure. And input will not only come from Alaska and from the so-called low cost carriers, (Southwest, jetBlue and AirTran) but also some regional carriers like SkyWest.

And I keep coming back to Republic.