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Self-Help or Self Sacrifice or Self Fulfilling Prophecy? What Will This Accomplish?

This week, Terry Maxon of the Dallas Morning News  wrote about the “surprised” reaction at American Airlines when a correspondent on NBC’s Today Show reported a “potential strike” at the airline following the holidays.

The show was a bit vague on its sources, but my best is that Laura Glading, President of the Association of Professional Flight Attendants, is working her media list to drum up a little coverage for the union’s latest negotiations gambit.

I consider myself a pretty good historian on most things airlines over the past 30 years.  And I remember the APFA’s divisive and destructive Thanksgiving strike in 1993 that attempted to bring the airline to its knees over the critical holiday travel period.  Last year, the union “celebrated” the 15th anniversary of the strike with a campaign they called “Remember November.”

For this year’s anniversary, the union is doing its best to remind the company of the pain it could again impose in a campaign that all but threatens another strike . . . this one called “Got Guts?” 

To be fair, the APFA has made clear that they do not plan to disrupt American’s operations over the holidays.  However, the union did say it was prepared to strike next year if no contract agreement is reached by January, with Glading saying she will consider asking the National Mediation Board for a “release” from negotiations – the first step toward seeking the right to “self help” under the Railway Labor Act.

First, let’s review the rules.  The NMB will grant a release only if it believes negotiations are at an impasse, and the bar for that is set pretty high.   A release would then open a 30-day “cooling off” period.  Only after that point and if the parties fail to reach agreement can either side engage in self help --  which for a union means work stoppages or strikes and for management allows a company to impose its “last offer” at the table or lock out striking workers.

So let’s be perfectly clear.  The union can’t strike now, no matter what the alarmists may say on Today. There is no guarantee that the NMB would grant a release. And even then, the RLA has several protections built in – the cooling off period and the prospect of a Presidential Emergency Board – to prevent the kind of work stoppages that could ground an airline and impact interstate commerce.

So why is the flight attendant union playing it out this way? Why on one hand are they talking strikes (which in some cases proves reason enough for passengers to “book away” from a particular airline) and on the other hand trying to reassure passengers that their holiday travel plans are safe?

Because that’s what unions in the industry too often have done. . . talk out of both sides of their mouth – paying lip service to their commitment to passengers while at the same time making demands and engaging in work actions that threaten the airlines’ ability to do business.

The Boeing Lesson

Let’s consider the real impact of strikes.

Last September I wrote here:  “In what is starting to be a rather ho-hum event in the aerospace/defense world, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAMAW) have decided to strike the Boeing Company for the second time in three years. Is this a “yawn moment” or a precursor of things to come as the airline industry begins in earnest the renegotiation of concessionary contracts?”  

In its negotiations, Boeing was looking to balance its economic offer to the union with added flexibility in its contracts the company needed to address the ups and downs in the business cycle.   The IAMAW was not willing to comply. So Boeing ultimately settled with the union, but not before further damage was done to an already fragile relationship. 

The real story, however, played out a few months later, when Boeing announced its decision to build a second production line to build the 787– not in Washington, its corporate home for decades, but in the right-to-work state of South Carolina.

Washington State officials reportedly worked hard to try to convince Boeing to stay, but at the end the state’s governor said the company’s decision to build the line in South Carolina came down to one thing: its difficult relationship with the Machinists union and a failure to reach a no-strike deal. 

And the pain may not be over for Washington’s IAMAW workers. At some point Boeing will need to begin manufacturing replacements for today’s 737 and 777 lines.  Where will those planes be built? 

What is particularly telling in this case is that the IAMAW was publicly dismissive of the fact that the union’s actions had anything to do with the company’s decision to add capacity in South Carolina. 

This is typical of labor of late.  But at some point unions in this space – whether airline or aerospace -- need to recognize the fundamental flaw in their collective bargaining agreements that too often work to choke productivity rather than promote it.

Looking ahead, I believe that the current round of airline negotiations must continue the transition/transformation underway in the US airline industry and address the sticking points in its contractual relationships with its labor force.  These include pay (which is unlikely to return to 2001 levels)  and productivity (which unions resist for fear of losing dues-paying union jobs).

The crux of the problem for labor as I see it is a failure to appreciate the delicate balance between pay and productivity. Without recognition that balancing the formula is critical, the industry, and individual carriers, will continue to find a more efficient means of doing the work.

Sadly, productivity is driven at its core by seniority and all the protections I’ve discussed in the past that unions provide so that long term members feast while newer members are left to feed on the scraps. 

Despite many of the gut-wrenching changes and cost cuts during the last negotiations cycle, the industry did nothing to restructure seniority – the “third rail” on union politics.  In my view, organized labor’s blind commitment to preserving seniority lies at the heart of a race to the bottom.  Yes, the revenue environment contributes more than its fair share to airline’s financial woes, but at some point labor has to accept responsibility for the role of these Depression-era ideologies.  The reality is that, last time around, airline wages were cut more than necessary because of union insistence on preserving seniority and limiting productivity.

Back to the Cabin

So it is in this environment that the APFA waves its strike threat like a red flag in the bullring.  The APFA website even features a report the union commissioned highlighting the failures of airline deregulation and the economic pressures on the industry. On a recent trip to Washington, Glading joined AFA-CWA President Pat Friend in urging the Obama Administration to “stabilize an industry that's not working” and reverse the “damage done” to the traveling public.

Call me nuts, but I’m guessing that Glading’s talk of a strike runs counter to her desire to “stabilize” the industry.  Perhaps other carriers would benefit from the union’s effort to ground the country’s second largest carrier in terms of revenue. But American – and all of its employees – wouldn’t see many benefits.

Or am I to believe that glorifying 1993 and rallying her members to strike in one of the most difficult times in airline history would alleviate the “damage done” to travelers?

I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again – the U.S. industry needs to do a better job of managing labor costs in boom and bust cycles in which fat contracts are approved in boom years only to require painful and at times draconian cuts when the cycle turns down.

Tellingly, and perhaps predictably, the unions are hoping a labor-friendly administration in Washington will help them gain new power in the industry – evidenced also by their efforts to change election rules at the NMB to make it easier to organize workers (even if the AFA-CWA, which is trying to organize at Delta, is hiding behind the AFL-CIO’s Transportation Trades Department to do it.)

What’s happened in Detroit over the last year is a pretty good indicator of what happens when an industry fails to get its costs in line with the market.  A smaller airline industry can’t absorb the same costs – including labor costs – that it did ten years ago.  Already we’ve been at this restructuring thing for more than five years and it’s pretty clear that the market has spoken.

So I’m really confused by what the APFA thinks it will get in return for a strategy that will only hurt the company that employs its members.

I don’t know what a strike buys anyone in this fragile business environment except, perhaps, an unpleasant ending.  Where I do agree with Ms. Glading is the importance of recognizing history.  I, for one, remember Pan Am, Eastern and TWA.  At the time, most believed those proud companies could weather any storm.  And I’d guess there may be another airline on that list before this cycle is complete.

If the past eight years have been rough and tumble, imagine what the next few years could be like as airlines reach pressure points in contract negotiations.   In that case, I can only imagine what would be left to celebrate on the 20th anniversary of APFA’s Thanksgiving Strike. 


Aviation News Just Breeds Itself in the Dallas Metroplex

Air Romo breaks his finger on the first play of overtime and is grounded for four weeks. American Airlines reports a profit for the third quarter of 2008; but only after accounting for the sale of American Beacon Advisors. Southwest Airlines posts its first quarterly loss in 17 years; but only after accounting for losses on certain hedge contracts. Had it not been for accounting issues, the news might have been much the same as American would have posted a loss and Southwest would have posted yet another profitable quarter.

But earnings are not “the” story for 2008’s third quarter given the volatility of jet fuel that occurred during a period when the passengers carried largely bought their tickets months ago. The story from the earnings announcements is more about the landscape on a going forward basis. Like many data points we assess and refer to, the Southwest loss deserves an asterisk.

The most interesting news thus far has been American Airlines announcing an order for 100 787-900 aircraft as part of its third quarter discussion. 42 of the aircraft are firm orders and are scheduled for delivery beginning in 2012. As the news came across the wire, I was preparing to give a lecture on networks. It was quite the buzz in the room as many of the students are like you and me and have jet fuel running through their veins.

There are many aspects of this announcement that I find encouraging. First, and simply, a US carrier announced a significant order for new technology as India's airlines consider cancelling orders. Second, and unlike many of the world’s carriers with orders for new aircraft, a US carrier is not ordering at the top of the cycle only to take delivery as the cycle turns down as will prove true with many carriers in Europe and Asia. Third, American did what it should do and make the delivery schedule contingent on a negotiated deal with the Allied Pilots Association.

Terry Maxon of the Dallas Morning News blogs on the APA’s reaction to American’s announcement that it is spending billions on new aircraft that will permit it to connect multiple dots on tomorrow’s global map. Of course the pilots are pleased that the company is investing in new equipment. Of course their reaction comes with the caveat that reinvestment in aircraft is only part of the necessary reinvestment in the airline. As the APA reminds us daily, restoring pay rates to some historical level in their current contract is also a necessary action.

I don’t know about you, but I am tired of the refrain of pay restoration. I am tired of the suggestion that these negotiations began in 2006. They did not. The negotiations began when the new rockers in the Metroplex, “Captain Lloyd and the No Planet Airmen”, took office and made a comprehensive proposal to management that was ultimately priced out at $3 billion dollars.

I have written here often of the need to change existing collective bargaining agreements as language just does not work. Well the APA rightfully points to a glaring reason why we need to rethink the entire labor construct. Pay rates have historically been based on the weight of the aircraft among other inputs. Well the weight of the 787 will be less as it made of composite materials. So now that does not work for the APA and there will have to be another approach.

I have been traveling and speaking again this week, so I missed Trebor Banstetter’s article on Tuesday in the Ft. Worth Star Telegram discussing the status of American's negotiations with its pilots. The APA seems to suggest that the NMB is partially to blame. Remember, as I have written here before: you have to clear the underbrush before a meaningful negotiation can take place on the economics otherwise - just put it on ice. The APA strategy to call for mediation still numbs this observer. I hope that they did not pay anyone for that advice.

But the real piece of information that I find most interesting as I catch up on my reading is a Banstetter blog post suggesting that there is a move on to rein in the national officers at APA. Lloyd and his band have become one song wonders and the membership needs more.

American has positioned itself to take a new narrowbody aircraft every 10 days beginning next year and to begin a growth and replacement strategy with the 787 beginning in 2012 all in managing the company for the long term. Hopefully the APA might begin to take notice from visionary pilot groups at Delta and Northwest that tomorrow really is different.

As always, this one is fun to watch. I wanted to post a piece I have been working on about autos and airlines again, but news here is so hard to resist.


Just Who Will Inherit the US Domestic Market? Don’t Forget Today’s “Regional Carriers”

Will the legacy carriers today be the domestic providers tomorrow?

This post has been partially written for about six weeks. The US domestic market presents us with many things to consider as it evolves. “Darwinists” will say it will be the “survival of the fittest”, or the strongest competitor will be the last standing. In October 2002, Eric A. Marks wrote a book: Business Darwinism: Evolve or Disolve: Adaptive Strategies for the Information Age. Marks was writing on the critical importance of information technology in accelerating the necessary grab for global market share. He used the phrase the “survival of the fastest”.

Whether it applies to the US airline industry and its participants or not, the use of a phrase like “evolve or disolve” certainly applies to the current carriers of all ilk providing service to customers within the US domestic airline market. So as we move into the season of capacity cutting in a significant way, one could ask if we are dissolving or simply engaged in a practice of attrition of uneconomic capacity? No matter how we choose to refer to this period, it is an evolution of an industry structure that is unknown.

Republic Airways, SkyWest and Possibly Others

In the past weeks, Republic Airways, a “US Regional Carrier”, has made some aggressive financial plays at each Frontier and Midwest. Both carriers have strong local market followings and that could be described as an understatement. Warren Buffett likes brands. Are hub markets brands? And if these hubs are joined?

Pilots at Midwest might say that the current ownership is using the Indianapolis-based carrier as a stalking horse to win pay and productivity relief from current contracts. In Frontier’s case, Republic is part of the group that provided the “Debtor In Possession” financing necessary for the Denver-based carrier to construct its plan of reorganization.

Neither Frontier nor Midwest are vital to tomorrow’s US domestic air transportation system - as we know it - and they are joined in that regard by Sun Country in Minneapolis. Whereas this observer has been vocal of a need to consolidate carriers in the “regional space”, I am thinking that there just might be something more to consider. I refer from time to time to a piece I did in 2003 entitled: Low Cost Carriers: Thou Shalt Not Inherit the Earth.

Not so much that there is a need to consolidate carriers in the regional space as many of them will simply dissolve as hubs are closed in the face of high oil; an overall slowing of demand; and less reliance on domestic traffic flows for the network legacy carriers. But I am thinking that carriers like Republic, under it visionary CEO, Bryan Bedford (who should have been a CEO at a legacy carrier already – but then again why would you want to do that?), and SkyWest just might be tomorrow’s US domestic capacity providers. Carriers like Republic and SkyWest just might be the competition for the surviving “Low Cost Carriers” like Southwest, jetBlue, AirTran and possibly Virgin America.

It is Republic and SkyWest that are buying the right-sized aircraft for a market with higher prices and slowing demand. It is Republic and SkyWest that are building fleet scope that provides each of them with the economies of scale that are critical to manage any and all associated costs. It is Republic and SkyWest that have aircraft to serve communities of all sizes that will make "narrow-minded" lawmakers happy. It is Republic and SkyWest that will be looking for "natural partners" to code-share with as they will need international network scope in order to maximize onboard revenue. Republic and SkyWest have learned the lessons from Independence Air and ExpressJet (edited) that built failed models focusing only on the US domestic market.


Hey Bill, what are you saying? I guess what I am saying very simply is that this labor negotiating period remains the most critical since deregulation – just as I have been saying for the past couple of years. As Aristotle first said, and was recently used by my dear friend Jon Abbet on the putting green when comparing the banking industries to the airline industry, “nature abhors a vacuum”. The US domestic airline system presents the greatest potential for a vacuum. Controllable costs have converged. But that will not last. Service from Lubbock to London would produce a vacuum if American were to leave and that will be filled. Lansing to Lagos would produce a vacuum if Northwest/Delta were to leave.

Carriers like Republic and SkyWest have the opportunity to take advantage of technology that ensures a “survival of the fastest” path. Remember the UPS whiteboard guy and the cargo industry - no real legacy impediments. Tomorrow they will be the carriers that deal more with an inefficient air traffic control system. STAR, SkyTeam and oneworld will only want to ensure that international connections arrive on time. Northwest and Delta have committed themselves to the US domestic market. But I am not sure that United, Continental, US Airways and American have. In the case of the latter two, they have more commitment today.

Whether it is seniority or a different compensation scheme for tomorrow’s "seniority" that works best for the future industry, never overlook a potential competitor - as it is present. That competitor is not the obvious but rather the well managed companies that have been tasked to adapt to the network model. Republic and SkyWest have.

So in this negotiation, labor will either figure it out or they will not. The US domestic network still provides the most jobs to the labor organizations representing the employees at the legacy network carriers. Will that be the case tomorrow? I am not sure. This is a time to negotiate a construct that rewards blood, sweat and tears. This is also a time to negotiate a construct that recognizes that tomorrow is different. And in the course of doing so, membership numbers can be protected, and possibly augmented.

So ask Boeing and the IAM if a strike is worth it? I am not sure. Ceding competitive advantage to Embraer and Bombardier and others in tomorrow's narrowbody market is the ultimate question. The same is true for airline labor. Domestic economics are different from international economics. Beware of the underdog as is it not the LCCs to fear, it is Republic and SkyWest. Attrit and dissolve; attrit and resolve. That is the question?

Never doubt that nature abhors a vacuum. For ALPA and pilot's unions this is a watershed issue as you represent both sectors. For the flight attendants, membership numbers might not grow but at least you will protect what you have. This is big. Really big.

More to come.


The Global Airline Industry and Its Interdependencies

It Is Not Just the U.S. Anymore

As this blog approaches its one year anniversary, I have written about many topics. While much of my writing thus far has been US-centric, we have often written about airline happenings around the globe. We have written about the forces of globalization and how US carriers have lost competitive traction when compared to the global elite carriers like AirFrance/KLM, Lufthansa/Swiss, Singapore, Cathay Pacific, Qantas and others. Yesterday, I wrote about the falling price of fuel and concern that announced capacity cuts might not become actual capacity cuts.

When it comes to fuel though, it is global forces that impact its price and they range from demand by rising industrial powers to the relative strength of currencies to market activity. As I do my lunchtime reading, I ran across a must read article written by Derek Sadubin, the Chief Operating Officer of the Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation in The Australian entitled: Deflation in price of oil not all good news for airlines.

Sadubin does a nice job of intertwining economic, competition, currency and oil events from around the globe to discuss the immediate future. He talks about a bear market for oil; business travel stalling; a difficult economic environment proving difficult for the weaker players; competitors rising to challenge incumbents in many parts of the world; a mention of Emirates and their plans to fly through the current difficulties and grow at the expense of other’s weaknesses; and the shift in the relative strength of currencies and the impacts on certain carrier revenues. This references only a few of his points.

But I suppose I liked the article also because he shares my view that the Boeing strike may not be a bad thing for the global industry. In an interview I did with Ted Reed of The Street.com last week, I was quoted as saying that a Boeing strike is not a worse case scenario. You know how it goes in this industry; we order planes in the up cycle and take delivery in a down cycle. It is not the US carriers that hold control over the order book, it is the international carriers. And maybe, the time may not be right for them to expend capital on new equipment to fly to new markets as the global economy slows.

If nothing else, the read reminds us of the global fundamentals that govern this industry and the interdependencies the many forces have that dictate this industry’s successes and failures.

More to come.


STEEEEEE….rike 1

It is September and pennant races are in full stride. The “wild cards” are up for grabs too as Major League Baseball works its way toward the playoffs.

In what is starting to be a rather ho-hum event in the aerospace/defense world: the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAMAW) have decided to strike the Boeing Company for the second time in three years. Is this a “yawn moment” or a precursor of things to come as the airline industry begins in earnest the renegotiation of concessionary contracts?

I am thinking this a precursor of things to come. Not quite sure if it is a yawn just yet. Whereas the aerospace/defense industry is quite different than the airline industry, there are similarities. The similarities begin with the simple fact that the manufacturers are a most important stakeholder in the virtuous circle of airline industry success; or failure as they represent an important cost element to the industry. For certain airline class and crafts of employees, a Boeing contract represents a trend.

Boeing is outsourcing. The airline industry is outsourcing. The world is outsourcing.

As J. Lynn Lunsford reports in this morning’s Wall Street Journal: “Resentment over outsourcing has been festering since the mid-1990s, when Boeing began a sweeping campaign to modernize its factories. The company has relied increasingly on contractors across the world to build larger and larger sections of its airplanes. By adopting many of the methods pioneered by the automobile industry, Boeing has been able to reduce the time it takes to build some of its jets by 50%.”

Resentment over Outsourcing - Airlines Too

Beginning in the mid 1990s, US airline industry labor has been festering over outsourcing too. First it was pilots and scope clause restrictions (1995 – 2001) that govern who could fly the first regional jets (50 seats and under for the most part). Those airlines with the fewest limitations placed large numbers of the small jets into service and garnered a “first-mover” advantage to be sure. There should be no mistake as to why US Airways was among the first to file for bankruptcy protection as the carrier had the most restrictive scope clause language and their network was attacked by those with freedom to overfly it. Finally, by 2001, relaxation of the scope limitations, allowing this size jet to fly, had largely been won in return for unaffordable fixed price contracts. Some mainline pilot agreements permitted the flying of 70-seat jets; others did not.

During the restructuring round of negotiations, scope clause limitations on the flying of 70-seat jets by regional partners were significantly relaxed. During that same period, the industry turned to outsourcing more of its heavy maintenance work as carriers looked to find ways to trim costs ala Southwest Airlines that has historically outsourced its heavy maintenance. Well here we go again. I see a pattern. And I do not like what I see because it just simply ignores fundamental issues.

Whereas the Boeing business/economic climate has been quite good and has produced significant profits of late, let’s not forget that the order book is full. Some say until 2017 and some say 2020. Whatever it is, profits can be forecast as the revenue stream can be calculated with some measure of certainty. Adjustments will need to be made to account for pre-strike delivery problems. And there may be some adjustments to be made for strike-related delays. But if the supply chain has been the issue, doesn’t a strike possibly allow certain suppliers to “catch up”? No matter, with the revenue stream reasonably certain it becomes a cost issue just like it did for the airline industry beginning in 2001.

Labor Arbitrage

This is what is at play for each Boeing and the US airline industry, isn’t it? As I turned to the financial dictionary online for a definition of labor arbitrage, this is what I found. Outsourcing: A practice used by different companies to reduce costs by transferring portions of work to outside suppliers rather than completing it internally.

Outsourcing is an effective cost-saving strategy when used properly. It is sometimes more affordable to purchase a good from companies with comparative advantages than it is to produce the good internally. An example of a manufacturing company outsourcing would be Dell buying some of its computer components from another manufacturer in order to save on production costs. Alternatively, businesses may decide to outsource book-keeping duties to independent accounting firms, as it may be cheaper than retaining an in-house accountant.

Damn, that outsourcing word again.

Where is the Crux of the Problem? Or Begin to Really Think About It

This is what few want to explore it seems. This round of negotiations simply needs to be a continuation of the transition/transformation period for the US airline industry and the contractual relationships with its labor force. I am not going to perfume the pig here. This is about a different set of wages and rules for the new workers that will comprise tomorrow’s industry that will be increasingly impacted by the ebbs and flows of global trade. The airline and aerospace industries can do better than the automobile and steel industries who acted much too late to protect the many good-paying jobs that remain.

And yes, there does need to be something in it for those that make up the industry today as well. The crux of the problem for labor as I see it is a lack of appreciation of the delicate balance between pay and productivity. Boeing is looking to balance an economic offer with flexibility if the business cycle requires it. Without recognition that balancing the formula is critical, the industry, and individual carriers, will continue what has become known as the "September Swoon" and miss the playoffs altogether. The “spiral down” - read job loss - will continue, strike or no strike. Markets will continue to be successful in finding the most efficient provider - they always are.

The simple question: why are job losses among the legacy US carriers approaching 200,000?

Or maybe the real crux of the problem is the seniority system. Ever wonder if tomorrow’s workers will really want such a system because it stands in the way an individual’s right to participate in the free market?

So I do think we will see strike 2. And probably a high, hard one that produces a swing and a miss that will cost someone the opportunity to continue on in the chase for the title of World Champion.

We are going to be bringing up many issues over the next couple of months.

More to come.