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Wednesday
Jun062012

US Airways And American And The Elephants In The Room

I want to talk about the elephant in the room.

Actually, it’s a whole herd of elephants in pink tutus with “Seniority Integration” and “Unintended Consequences” emblazoned in neon lettering across their posteriors. Yet, most media seem too distracted by sexy headlines and hoped for revenue synergy calculations an alleged US Airways – American Airlines tie-up might bring to even notice the elephants.

Maybe they’re right. The customer doesn’t care what uniform the pilot flying the plane wears or what that pilot’s career prospects look like. They just want that pilot to safely get them to where they’re going.

US Airways is a perfect example that ignoring the elephant can work with few external (i.e. passenger) repercussions: it hasn’t fully integrated pilots or flight attendants since merging with America West in 2005. After nearly seven years of flying separate-and-not-nearly-equal crews on two coasts, maybe US thinks the elephant is just a mouse. Heck, company president Scott Kirby said taking over American Airlines would actually solve US’s problem:

"It's ironic but the solution to that issue at US Airways I think it's probably because we're able to get this deal done. The area that people focus on the most is USAPA, our pilots' union. In this case there is a huge benefit for our pilots in getting the deal done.”

Kirby’s comments would also seem to hold true for flight attendants. He even pointed out merging work groups would be subject to the McCaskill-Bond legislation… created in part, by American’s 2001 takeover of TWA and the short-end of the deal those employees received.

And that’s where the elephants start trumpeting.

I’ll concede again that seniority integration doesn’t mean anything to the average customer. But it means everything to airline employees and, because of the very McCaskill-Bond law Kirby mentioned, even to those employees who don’t belong to a union. They, too, will be subject to the law and the vagaries of seniority integration.

If the Allied Pilots Association really believes seniority integration is, as its spokesperson Tom Hoban labeled it, a “faux concern,” then it’s ignoring its own recent past.  If I am an APA pilot and my union is calling seniority integration a faux concern, well I would be concerned.

If the Association of Professional Flight Attendants thinks it will join hands with US and its senior members will either cash out or staple US’s two groups to the bottom of the seniority list – like the APFA did to the TWA flight attendants – its remaining members will have plenty of time to regret that decision when they’re flying Richmond, VA to Greenville, SC via Charlotte for the third time that day.

REAPING WHAT THEY SOWED

The very group APFA leaders either think they will harmoniously bond with or take precedence over (and I’m betting it’s the latter more than the former) is the Association of Flight Attendants.  The AFA represents two distinct groups at US – the flight attendants from the “old” US Airways and former America West FAs – which have never worked under a joint contract. Kirby’s mention of McCaskill-Bond is especially pertinent in this potential combination of three different flight attendant groups, each with its own pay rates, work rules and benefits.

Why? Well, this is what the AFA says about McCaskill-Bond:

“In 2001, American Airlines purchased TWA. The TWA flight attendants, represented at the time by the lAM, were stapled to the bottom of the American Airline's flight attendant seniority list. The AA flight attendants are represented by the APFA. This was grossly unfair to the former TWA flight attendants. The TWA flight attendants fought back. They were unable to right the wrong that had been done to them. But they were able to, with the help of Congress, ensure that it will not happen again.”

Doesn’t sound like the AFA is ready to take a jump-seat to anyone, especially not a group that was “grossly unfair” to other flight attendants. No matter what promises US’s Doug Parker and Scott Kirby have made to the APFA and president Laura Glading. US flight attendants are going to have a say about what part of the pie they get. It’s also important to remember neither AFA group has approved a new contract with US – in fact, they overwhelmingly rejected the last tentative agreement two months ago.

Currently, the APFA has, in total, the best pay, benefits and work rules in the industry. (A decision on American’s 1113 motion in U.S. bankruptcy court could change that). US Airways are among the lowest compensated. Doug Parker will probably promise his own flight attendants they’ll move up to APFA pay, and with the reported “early out” incentive offered as part of the US-APFA deal (about 80 percent of APFA’s members would qualify under the union’s stated parameters including President Glading), would quickly dominate the seniority lists.

That’s probably not going to be enough for the US flight attendants. They’ll likely – and, perhaps, justly – demand the same early outs, guaranteed seniority and other incentives. McCaskill-Bond calls for arbitration, though US Airways says it is “hoping” for a negotiated settlement. This is the same group hasn’t been able to negotiate contracts with any of its current flight groups in seven years, yet “hopes” for agreements with three different unions all clamoring for top billing?

That doesn’t even take into consideration the lawsuits that will be generated when the remaining APFA members realize they’ve been sold out or either of the AFA groups feel they’ve been shorted.

Speaking of lawsuits, the APA knows a bit about seniority integration court battles. When American took over bankrupt TWA, the APA argued in the Supreme Court of the United States that its members deserved seniority over all Trans World pilots because TWA crews had limited to no future prospects and no reasonable “healthy carrier” would agree to merge if its employees didn’t take precedence. Some call this the “failed carrier doctrine” and it is still applicable with the McCaskill-Bond legislation. The APA won its case in front of the Supreme Court, so it shouldn’t be surprised if USAPA East & West use it against them.

Of course Kirby thinks merging will solve US’s current integration problems. The USAPA pilots are salivating over new planes, APA’s high pay rates and benefits and the chance at more international routes. They’ll happily staple APA to the bottom of the seniority list to get those perks.

Perhaps APA president David Bates really believes the former America West pilots will just give way to the APA’s claims on seniority. He met with USAPA pilots in Charlotte last month and touted the meeting as a beginning of negotiations to resolve the issue.

I don’t believe any “negotiations” are going to resolve this issue quickly or simply… and I see no way APA members come out of this scenario better in the long-term. Union solidarity only goes so far and US pilots have been waiting years for an opportunity like this.

More telling I thought was a quote in The Charlotte Observer from USAPA president Gary Hummell:

"My job, even though we are looking forward to a cooperative effort, is to protect USAPA pilots (and) to ensure our pilots get the best contract they can."

Even if that means it’s at the expense of the APA.  Even if this means making American out to be a failing carrier.

WHITHER TWU?

The Transport Workers Union International and many of the locals haven’t exactly rushed into the arms of US Airways. Unlike APFA, which has thrown itself at US like .... well I won't say it, or APA, with its “studious business” approach, TWU has seemingly shrugged its collective shoulders about the US “deal.”

That’s probably because the US agreement isn’t much different from the one AA recently offered TWU. The Mechanics and Related and Stores work groups rejected American’s proposal, but I doubt they’re holding their breath waiting for US Airways to save them.

The TWU is being realistic. Besides saving some jobs – which the M&R and Stores groups decided wasn’t enough reason to approve the AA offer – there’s not a lot US can do for TWU members. They’ve heard US’s promises of limited job protection and bringing more maintenance in-house, but a quick look at DOT numbers also shows US currently has one of highest percentages of outsourced maintenance in the industry. Hard to believe it would be more cost efficient for US to give that work to TWU.

Plus, the TWU successfully used the failed carrier doctrine against TWA as well. While its 24,000 members at American dwarf the number of ground workers at US, TWU leaders know their own arguments will be used against them in arbitration. The TWU has seen what has happened to ground workers at other failed airlines and, at this point, can only hope to minimize its losses.

TWU also lost a bitter and expensive battle against IAM to represent workers at US and, as any political junkie knows, unseating an incumbent is neither easy nor cheap.

WHAT’S IT ALL MEAN?

I’ve already admitted seniority battles might mean little to nothing to customers and operations. That’s possibly enough for Wall Street types who are bounding after this potential consolidation like dogs chase cars.

There are, though, real concerns for other financial stakeholders.  One complex integration should give them pause - but three battles should/will make them nauseous.

US has touted the synergies merging with American would immediately bring. What happens to those synergies if integrating pilots, flight attendants and ground workers drags on, or as I expect, become overly contentious and litigious?

US Airways’ own track record – now going on seven years - shows it cannot facilitate integrated contracts and is quick to suggest the reason is because of internal union squabbles. “Old” US flight attendants fly with “old” US pilots, segregated from their former-America West peers. If a similar situation develops with a devoured American workforce, those already questionable synergies become even more degraded. In other words, the risk and return calculation might be worth further consideration by AMR’s creditors.

There are also a couple of other elephants standing off in the corner that bear watching. First is US Airways own unions, specifically the AFA and the IAM. None of those three groups (remember, AFA represents two distinct flight attendant units at US) are very happy with Parker and Co. right now. Contract negotiations have dragged on with US holding the line on costs because of its structural revenue underperformance relative to the industry.

Yet the IAM and AFA saw Parker and Kirby promise the moon, stars and assorted planets to American’s union leaders. They have significant leverage, including asking the National Mediation Board for release. With an election quickly approaching, a Democratic White House might be hard put to ignore the treaties of two very influential labor organizations, both of which wield more power than American’s unions. Keep in mind, the current chairperson of the NMB is former AFA president Linda Puchala.

Then there are American’s non-union employees. The CWA is currently trying to organize American’s 10,000 agents and representatives, even though the CWA has publicly admitted the majority of those employees don’t want a union. Well, guess who represents US Airways passenger service representatives? That’s right, the CWA. (It also is partnered with the AFA). In a merger, American’s PSRs would get a union whether they wanted one or not, most likely without a vote and probably find themselves on the bottom of the seniority scale. Their – and the other non-union AA employees not happy about their new seniority “rank” – only recourse might be the courts.

The last elephant is more of a wooly mammoth: extinct, but vestiges still remain. That would be the group of employees the APA, APFA and TWU all made bones off of… the former TWA workers. This could be their last shot to right some wrongs and adding them into the mix exponentially increases the level of difficulty of integration.

"We have a chance for a fresh start here," Roger Graham, a spokesman for the former TWA flight attendants, told Ted Reed of TheStreet.com earlier this month.  At least there is one group of employees who might benefit from this proposed merger.

It’s hard to fathom why no one has really taken notice of the elephants. Maybe because they obscure Wall Street’s desire for a (very) short-term gain despite the longer-term implications. Maybe it’s because American’s unions are simply using US as leverage with no intent to expose their members to the possible risks of actually going through with the merger. Or maybe it’s because ignoring them makes it easier for Parker and Kirby to believe this deal is really as simple as they pretend.

Maybe the court and AMR’s creditors, blinded by pro forma financial reasoning that is, sadly, often divorced from airline industry reality and the notion of competitive response, will embrace the US proposal as the best value for their dollars.

If they do, they should beware that discounts to the pro forma estimate are called for because of the elephants in the room.

APFA, by not making a deal with the company in 1113, should be questioned by its members about its decision to put all of its eggs in the US basket under the failed leadership doctrine.

Finally, the TWA pilots reared their heads last week by filing suit against American Airlines and the Allied Pilots Association. 

Looks to me like -- game on.

Monday
Dec052011

American Airlines, Labor Leverage, US Airways and Chicken Little

Labor Leverage and Other Thoughts

Since American’s filing for bankruptcy protection last week, I’ve received many notes asking why I am not writing about American - about a potential combination with US Airways or what I expect the company to win from the unions.  I haven’t written because, frankly, I already talked about the potential consequences of bankruptcy for the airline, unions and the industry in my most recent piece.

On Monday, I intended to write about leverage and how the Allied Pilots Association was seriously misjudging the leverage it thought it had. Tuesday’s filing kind of made that point moot.   As the Sections 1113 and 1114 negotiating process wends its way through a court supervised restructuring, the pilots and all unionized employees will either reach consensual agreements with the company or the company will look to the court to terminate the existing agreements.  Whichever outcome, the new contracts will look nothing like the potential deals the unions could have negotiated at various times over the past five plus years.

I know, I know… “American could have reached a deal if it wanted.” It does take two to tango, but in this round of negotiations, American and its unions were listening to vastly different music. American’s offers provided cost benefits that would be realized over the long-term while still maintaining what can only be described as an industry-best benefits package. That wasn’t going to sit well with analysts and Wall Street types who fervently believed the airline needed immediate gains to remain viable.

The unions, seemingly, wanted everything to magically return to past patterns and routinely called for restoration of the pay and benefits they conceded in 2003 to stave off bankruptcy. A common refrain has been no union members have seen substantial increases in wages since 2001. Peers at other airlines did get raises, but American’s employees were – and are - still better off.  It’s a simple, provable truth and it meant there was no going back to 2003 or 1993. It’s a different industry and a different world.

That’s key to understanding there is no leverage for either side in this round of negotiations. (Are you listening, United pilots?) It’s also why this negotiations cycle has been so difficult. Few agreements have been struck. American will likely get deals well before we see contracts – or even tentative agreements - at United and US Airways.  As the bankruptcy process plays out, the American pilots and flight attendants will no longer have industry leading contracts among the network legacy carriers – Delta will.

And guess who comes up next for negotiation – the Delta pilots.  Like American’s management over the past five years, Delta’s management will have to negotiate improved terms and conditions on the highest cost labor contract in existence. All the while, the United/Continental pilots will spend more time asking who is on first than they will spend at a negotiation table.  Looks to me like all of that “leverage” being created by the United pilots alleging poor safety policies by management is NOT moving the parties quickly toward a deal.

While I expect the Delta pilot negotiations to be complicated and difficult for the company, at least the pilots enjoyed some benefit following the merger with Northwest and the bankruptcy agreements that preceded it.  Delta’s pilots will have the richest compensation package in the industry after American completes its bankruptcy negotiations. That means they won’t have any leverage over the company even as pilots squawk about the liberal scope clause in the current agreement. 

In this process, there is a different kind of “trickle down” theory. Case in point: The TWU employees at American. Talk about no leverage.  The more removed from the flight deck, the more leverage dwindles. American’s below-the-wing employees currently earn a total compensation package of roughly $25 per hour. That work can be outsourced for 40 cents on the dollar.   Add the fact  American outsources the least amount of maintenance work in the industry, and that it has more ground workers than any other airline, well, you get the feeling things are going to change. If you’re a TWU worker, that’s probably no comfort.  

All This Talk About A Merger With US Airways

I am surprised – no, blown away - by just how much attention the US Airways – American merger possibility is getting.  In the first 36 hours after AA filed for protection it seemed the world was suggesting a merger with US Airways was the only viable exit strategy.  I don’t believe it.  American will have the exclusive right to file a Plan of Reorganization (POR) for 180 days – a right that is typically extended multiple times by the presiding judge.

Keep in mind, all three of American’s unions were appointed to the unsecured creditors committee. Any plan of reorganization by a party other than AA will have to convince the committee their plan is better for all stakeholders.  Given the messy labor situation that remains at US – six years after its merger with America West – I sincerely doubt anyone would find a US bid credible… especially American’s unionized workforce.  

That’s why, at least right now, I simply don’t see a merger happening, despite industry analyst Vaughn Cordle’s contention that, “regardless of the ugly nature of merging two suboptimal business models and different unions, American's best option is to merge with US Airways.”  My first question is, why would you even think of merging two suboptimal business models in the first place?  So that you can compete directly against balance sheet and network rich United and Delta?

There is another option I don’t think many analysts have considered.  I could see a competing plan led by British Airways and other oneworld partners that would have the potential to win if the AA case gets to the point where outside parties are free to submit alternative PORs – even at today’s 25% foreign ownership limit.  If you believe AA will become a smaller entity over the coming months, the one sure thing is AA’s network will be optimized to maximize revenue generation with its new joint venture partners.  That’s precisely what STAR is doing through United and SkyTeam with Delta. 

The Sky Is Not Falling

Over at Terry Maxon’s AirlineBiz blog is a letter from TWU President Jim Little decrying American’s filing with $4.1 billion in cash and thus a near term ability to pay its current obligations.  I urge you to read the letter in full and the lack of reasoning throughout.  What did Little expect the company to do when he refused on numerous occasions to step-up and tell his TWU members the cold truth that something is better than nothing?  He has had a number of opportunities over the past five years to negotiate an agreement with American that the company could afford. 

The bottom line is bankruptcy is not a big deal.  This is not the industry’s first rodeo.  American’s problems are bigger than a check labor could write outside of bankruptcy, but sadly, the employees will pay much more inside of bankruptcy.   As APA President Dave Bates told The Wall Street Journal, "Sometimes in life it's easier to have something imposed upon a person than have them agree to it voluntarily."  Sad commentary indeed.

Monday
Nov142011

FORT WORTH, Texas: The Longer It Goes, The Worse It Will Get

Another Sunday in the Washington D.C. area means being forced to watch the Redskins if you want to watch some football.  I wanted to watch some football, but catching up on my reading was much more interesting.  As is typically the case, my starting point is Terry Maxon's Airline Biz Blog.  Three of Maxon’s last four posts pertain to the negotiations between American Airlines and the Allied Pilots Association.

Each of the parties issued a statement regarding the decision not to negotiate over the past weekend with both pointing fingers at each other.  The understanding, at least for those of us on the outside looking in, is the company is seeking to reach an agreement in principle with pilots before this week’s regularly scheduled AMR Board of Director’s Meeting. 

I have participated in numerous troubled negotiations between management and labor, and taking time off because someone is tired prior to a deadline just does not make any sense.   Maybe the APA doesn’t think it is negotiating against a deadline.  I am also someone who knows a little bit about Board of Directors meetings and fiduciary duty, so if I was the APA, I would be taking Wednesday’s meeting seriously.

After all of the news, reviews and Wall Street’s muse over American’s financial blues I am guessing that AMR’s Board of Directors is feeling under pressure.  And Boards under investor pressure often feel the need to act.  As I wrote in American: Limited Options, Pain Likely, something at the Fort Worth, Texas carrier likely needs to give if no labor deals are reached – particularly a pilot deal that could serve as a template for other work group agreements.  The potential scenarios are, of course, bankruptcy, getting significantly smaller outside of bankruptcy or getting smaller inside of court-assisted restructuring.

Some of the messages I received on that piece suggested bankruptcy is an acceptable solution for American’s situation, particularly when dealing with the current management.  I think all of American’s union groups, and especially the pilots, should be very careful what they wish for.  Never forget the truism that it is probably best to deal with the devil you know.

The fact is employees at American still have their benefits, including pensions, because CEO Gerard Arpey chose not to use bankruptcy proceedings to cut costs the way everyone else in the industry did. Whether the unions like or dislike Arpey, though, is moot. If American files Chapter 11, creditors and the courts probably won’t let Arpey guide the airline during its time in bankruptcy.  They’ll want a restructuring guy, possibly in the mold of United’s Glenn Tilton, who turned his back on company history and acted in the best interests of financial capital, not employees to reposition the enterprise. That caused some serious labor/management relationship wounds.

American can survive labor discord as it has since Robert Crandall was in charge. I’m not as sure American comes out of bankruptcy unscathed – at least, not the American Airlines that we’ve known for the last 85 years. A much different airline would likely emerge, if at all, so emotionally-charged employees might rue their actions today.

Let’s review a few facts about bankruptcy and North American airlines.  Since 1991 there have been 14 airline bankruptcies and only one carrier remains a stand-alone airline today – financially troubled Air Canada.  Eight of the airlines have been liquidated or ceased operations:  Pan Am, TWA, Aloha, ATA, Skybus, EOS, Arrow and Mexicana (Eastern filed for bankruptcy in March of 1989 and ceased flying in January of 1991).  The remaining five airlines have been merged:  US Airways, United, Delta, Northwest and Frontier.

While the merged companies are stronger, they lost most – if not all - of their individual identity.  A merger partner with American in its current financial and labor condition is unlikely.  Private equity would only be interested in American after a deep cleansing of labor contracts in bankruptcy.  After all, even private equity wants clean fingernails when the entity emerges from court protection.

Union groups need to think long and hard about what that means for them. For American’s flight attendants and ground workers, a Chapter 11 filing would be the end of the world as they know it.

American’s flight attendants fly the least of any cabin crew in the U.S. airline industry. They currently pay less for medical coverage than their peers and still have pensions and retiree medical that are but faded memories for flight attendants at other carriers.

There are roughly 25,000 TWU members employed at American – mechanics, baggage handlers, cabin cleaners. A bankrupt American would dramatically slash that number, outsourcing a majority of jobs as much of the industry already does. Pensions, retiree medical – all gone. The reverberations would shake big cities like Miami and communities like Tulsa where the American maintenance base is the largest private corporate taxpayer.

Pilots like to think they’re different, more crucial to the operation, more prepared to handle anything that arises. That’s their job, and most are very, very good at what they do. The members at the Allied Pilots Association, though, should use the same reasoning and spend some time rethinking their position.

As MIT’s Airline Data Project shows, on average, American’s pilots are already making about two-percent more than their peers. The thing that should make pilots uneasy, though, is when you look at their benefits, which are worth about 40+ percent more than what pilots at other network carriers make. There is not a bankruptcy judge in the country who won’t immediately allow the company to toss all of that out the window.  It is not the wages per se; it is the benefit package and relatively poor productivity that makes the American pilot agreement uneconomic when compared to peer carriers. 

I’m not privy to what’s being talked about at the table between pilots and American, but the company is posting all of its proposals on its public web site, AANegotiations.com. From what I’ve seen, American’s current offers don’t dramatically change pilot benefits… they would still be significantly better than other carriers. What hasn’t been posted is any item on scope, and I’m sure the pilots would vehemently oppose any changes, no matter how necessary or warranted they might be.

If anyone on the APA Board foolishly thinks bankruptcy wouldn’t be so bad, they should review those facts I mentioned earlier. Besides the loss of pensions and work rules, a post-bankruptcy American would either be much smaller – meaning fewer pilots needed-- or prey to other airlines circling its carcass. If it’s plucked as a weak-sister acquisition, those APA pilots would most likely lose their seniority taking a backseat – or right seat – to their new colleagues.  And that assumes that acquiring airlines would even want former American employees – particularly in seniority order.

I could absolutely envision a U.S. airline industry without American.  Think of the value of the Heathrow slots, the LaGuardia slots, the JFK slots, the Washington National slots, the related real estate at each of the former, a ready-made Deep South America operation in Miami and an opportunity for network and low-cost carriers alike to finally get necessary real estate at Chicago O’Hare to mount a competitive operation.  American’s parts could be worth more than its whole to creditors and other airlines.

From a Board of Directors perspective, there are some basic facts to contend with. You cannot restructure the price of jet fuel.  Most, if not all, of American’s assets are pledged as collateral so little might be achieved in the airplane area other than rejecting certain leases on the oldest and most inefficient narrowbody fleet in the industry.  The company faces significant loan repayments and pension contributions.  In other words, AMR has every reason to file.

The pilots and the APA can belay that. They can be the leaders they think they are; not just for themselves, but for every other employee at American. Negotiating a deal now sends a signal to Wall Street, creditors and even consumers that things really can change. It also lessens the pressure on AMR’s Board of Directors to take a more active role in the company’s day-to-day dealings. Without it, the only pragmatic course for the Board would be to seriously examine its next steps. It can’t wait on the promise of a labor deal, especially if the APA mistakenly believes it has leverage and wants to try and use it.  Even if an agreement were reached today, it will be sometime in the first quarter of 2012 before the voting on a new agreement is concluded - that is why time is not on the side of the pilots and why AMR's Board is likely to grow restless if something does not happen soon.

Should a Chapter 11 restructuring end in Chapter 7 for some reason (a probability greater than 0 given that the company may be forced to cede control of its right to file a plan of reorganization), one can envision U.S. air transport system without American Airlines.  History suggests that the capacity void left will be filled in short order by the remaining players.  If a profitable hub opportunity exists for a remaining airline, it will be filled.  Will there need to be a hub at DFW?  No.  But there is plenty of local traffic to fill new service from existing airlines as well as Southwest at Love Field.  American’s aircraft order will likely be absorbed by the remaining carriers over the coming years to help fill the void left.

I just wrote “An Unpleasant Situation That Continually Repeats” last week that focused on unions thinking they know what is best for the company at both Qantas and Air Canada.  Maybe American was the sequel I was thinking about when I wrote that piece.  If that sequel includes bankruptcy, I know the story ends badly for the working men and women at American.  The rest of the industry will applaud the demise.

Monday
Sep052011

American: Limited Options, Pain Likely

Many readers have let me know that they are not as encouraged about the financial prospects of American Airlines with its massive aircraft order as I was in this piece. After all, the folks at AMR have problems beyond an ancient fleet, including an anemic revenue performance relative to the industry, high labor costs and all the other economic misery inflicted on many airlines in the past ten years.

I believe that AA’s aging fleet contributes some to the competitive disadvantage it suffers, and bright, shiny, fuel-efficient new planes will help impress customers and cut fuel and maintenance costs.  But what comes next?

Anxious analysts point to the fact that the price of oil impacts everyone, yet AA’s performance lags quarter after quarter. And there’s seemingly no significant movement yet in the airline’s labor negotiations, despite years at the bargaining table. With contract costs higher than anyone else in the industry, the company wants more productivity and smarter work rules in exchange for enhancements. All the while the unions have dug in either thinking or pretending that their righteous indignation will somehow turn the global economy and thus the industry around and recoup for labor all of losses in recent years.

American is one of the few carriers out there that didn’t turn to bankruptcy to shed some of these costs. In bankruptcy you cannot restructure the price of oil, but you can shed the leases of the least desirable aircraft, work with creditors to reduce debt and make changes to the labor agreements. But bankruptcy is probably not a realistic option now.

This is not 2002 with the shadow of 9/11 cast over the proceedings. This is not 2005 when the price of oil began its march upward and served as a catalyst for the bankruptcy filings of Northwest and Delta on the same day. 

No it is 2011, 10 years past the date that the country would like to forget.  Now, many airlines are flush with cash and don’t have the liquidity scares that were present when others filed. Many U.S. airlines are making money or at the very least are cash positive, despite jet fuel prices at the equivalent of a barrel of oil at $130. 

American, however, is on the wrong end of the industry today and some smart people question whether it will survive to see it’s much talked about long-term plans take wing.

So, let’s assume that Avondale Partners’ airline analyst Bob McAdoo was right in his May 16, 2011 analysis that American simply needs to shed capacity.  McAdoo cited US Airways as an example, where new management culled 20 percent of jet capacity.  But what he did not figure in is the likely relief American would need from its pilots union to make that kind of correction possible. More on that later.

American still relies on its regional partners to fly 37 and 44 seat jets because they are part of the pilot contract’s “scope” equation that determines the number of larger regional jets American can fly.  A 20 percent reduction in flying, much of it on long haul wide body routes flown by senior crews, would likely result in a furlough of up to another 1,500 pilots.  But American can’t do that either because of the same contract provisions that say American cannot drop below 7,200 pilots on the active roster.  And that doesn’t even take into consideration what the other union groups may have in their contracts that prevent the company from making the kind of changes that may be necessary to save the airline.

So what choice does American Airlines have?  Cutting that much capacity will be extremely painful for employees, and could put at least an additional 11,000 other American Airlines workers on the furlough list and in the unemployment line.  Cutting that much capacity would also redraw American’s network and route structure as we know it, giving its competitors greater strength in some cities and markets where American’s presence would dwindle or disappear.

McAdoo’s analysis calls for American to pull down certain Chicago to London flying; cut flights to Buenos Aires from multiple AA gateways; eliminate service to India;  reduce by half the flights from Chicago to China; and trim transcon service between JFK, Los Angeles and San Francisco.

McAdoo also challenges American’s “Cornerstone Strategy.”  In addition to flying a money-losing route between London Heathrow and Los Angeles, American is building its LAX presence using those inefficient, small regional jet aircraft. The same is true at Chicago and New York JFK.  In McAdoo’s view, Chicago is too dependent on connecting traffic at fares that are not compensatory.  Further he claims that in many instances, Chicago and Dallas/Ft Worth compete for many of same passengers connecting to points east and west and internationally and therefore are redundant service. 

Maybe it is time to de-emphasize LAX because the mix of traffic makes profitability difficult.  Maybe it is time to pull out of O’Hare because de-leveraging a hub is tricky particularly with an aggressive United hubbing in the same market.  Honestly, the only real big bang [removing fixed costs] American may have left is to massacre a hub like Chicago the way US Airways did to Pittsburgh and Delta did to Dallas/Ft. Worth.  The bigger the hub takedown, the bigger the fixed cost savings.

As for New York, American is now third in the market behind Continental at Newark and Delta at JFK and offers less connecting service than does Delta at JFK.  American’s relationship with jetBlue was supposed to address some of these competitive disadvantages but, as McAdoo points out, one can look a long time before finding many jetBlue to American connections in the various distribution systems. 

In the local New York market, AMR’s revenue per seat mile is underperforming when compared to peers at JFK and Newark.  Maybe it is time for American to pull out of JFK except for some select Trans-Atlantic flying, select transcon flying, and turn the rest of the region’s feed over the jetBlue.  But oneworld is depending on American to make New York the best market it can be for the alliance so this would be harder to do.  In fact with more 70-seat aircraft American could actually become more competitive there.  That would, again, depend on the pilot union’s willingness to do the right thing.

There is no doubt that a 20 percent cut in capacity would cause significant pain at American, even if it might be absolutely necessary to address the airline’s structural problems. But what if the cuts go even deeper?  What will be the impact on necessary American Eagle capacity that American has contracted for in the new Air Services Agreement?  If there is no Eagle feed, then there is no need for many mainline aircraft now dependent on the flow from points of all sizes behind and beyond the hub.  The virtuous circle spirals downward. 

At that point, American’s Cornerstone Strategy will be more about Dallas/Ft Worth, Miami and a little New York JFK and Los Angeles.  And the labor savings will come simply by cutting headcount.

To be clear, McAdoo says very clearly that labor costs are not the main driver of American’s weak results.  “Stopping the long haul bleeding has more direct leverage than trying to offset the losses by squeezing labor,” he said.  But in this scenario, labor is a large component of the fixed costs shed.

And on a strict profitability analysis, McAdoo may be right.  But contractual restrictions like pilot scope clauses – and American’s pilot scope clause is the most restrictive of network carriers – hamstring the company from making necessary tactical and strategic decisions. It is pretty clear that that American would not be flying as many mainline 136-seat aircraft today if it were able to utilize 70 seat aircraft like its competitors.  If that were the case, we may not be having this discussion.  And American Eagle would certainly not be flying 37 and 44 seat configurations in today’s fuel environment if not for the mainline pilot scope clause.

These small aircraft, “scope busters” to their critics, are used for many reasons and in this case they are used to average down the seat size of the regional fleet so that larger aircraft can be flown.  By the way, the competition flies 70-seat aircraft at will, primarily with the borders of the contiguous United States.  They can compete on frequency because they have right sized aircraft.  American does not.  Remember CALite?

Those who suggest that there is no labor problem at American should look no farther than the pilot agreement.  Among other common-sense adjustments, either American needs relief from that scope agreement in order that it can compete on equal footing with its domestic peers and provide the U.S. network feed to its oneworld partners that they demand, or the Allied Pilots Association needs to negotiate a regional-like contract for domestic flying as the A319s are delivered.  I wrote about these two options in March 2010 when I asked:  Mainline Pilot Scope: Will Regional Carriers Be Permitted to Fly 90+ Seat Aircraft?

It is unlikely that management at other airlines are going to make any deals that drive up their own labor costs only to have to go back and ask for relief later.

So there is not likely going to be the kind of labor cost convergence American hopes for in this round of negotiations; therefore, American may still have a labor cost disadvantage relative to the industry, particularly on productivity and benefits and scope.  This coupled with continuing economic challenges and pressure from investors and analysts will necessarily limit the extent to which American can sweeten its contract proposals to buy labor peace.  Purchasing labor peace only exacerbates the Ft. Worth carrier’s problems.

By all appearances, even the National Mediation Board recognizes that American does not have the money to satisfy the inflated demands of the unions that seem unwilling to discuss anything that smacks of a concession.

The upshot is that the unions at American may want to think hard about a draw-a-line-in-the-sand strategy that has done nothing but contribute to the airline’s under-performance. The contracts have to be part of an overall plan to get American out of the financial doldrums if the company is going to be able to execute the kind of financial and operational maneuvering that is absolutely necessary to win back the hearts and minds of the investment community – let alone customers and alliance partners.

A failure to make strategic, forward-looking agreements at the negotiations table now could have ramifications well beyond the individual contracts.  And there’s not a lot of time to waste in the process.  With limited options, the structural changes will prove painful.  

Saturday
Feb122011

Nature Abhors A Vacuum - Proving True At The Allied Pilots Association

Having been critical of some union leadership in the past, I now must acknowledge when some get it right.  And that someone is Captain David Bates, the president of the Allied Pilots Association at American Airlines.

I may not be doing Captain Bates any favors here. In the sometimes irrational world of union politics, leaders too often are applauded for destructive rather than constructive behavior, which is one reason labor relations are such a mess in the airline industry.  But here goes:

There have been few topics covered as extensively at www.swelblog.com as negotiations between American Airlines and its pilots represented by the APA.  My take is that for too long the APA’s behavior and actions were not becoming of a professional pilots union.  I wrote many times about Captain Lloyd Hill (Bate’s predecessor) and his term of empty promises:  All Eyes on Texas; Just Put It On Ice: American’s Ability to Pay ? APA’s Expectations; Maybe the Allied Pilots Association Is Really Onto Something; American Airlines and the Allied Pilots Association: A $3 Billion Question and AA’s Labor Negotiation Scenarios Get Even More Interesting to name a few.  His delusional approach to union leadership often landed Hill a starring role in the ongoing saga of Captain Lloyd and the Lost Planet Airmen.

My last post on the flight attendants union at American, A Flight Attendant Representation Inflection Point? received a lot of attention.  And it is most relevant to what transpired this week when Bates delivered his speech to the APA Board of Directors.  I have wondered many times how APA’s new leader would begin the process of ending the tough and reckless  leadership style of his predecessor and transition to a style he has shown to be tough yet pragmatic.  His words to his Board very clearly follow his actions in his first seven months in office.

As I’ve said before, there is a financial concept lost on union leaders today:  Net Present Value (NPV.)   It means simply that cash flows realized in the short term have more value to the firm (or individual) than cash flows generated years down the road. 

Bates recognizes this in his speech when he states early on: “We're now coming up on the five-year anniversary of when management opened up contract negotiations. Your National Officers know what the pilots want in this contract. We know that our earning power is diminishing each and every day.”  [the concept of NPV loud and clear].

The next five paragraphs of Bates’ speech speak plainly and loudly with a message that should be heeded by labor leaders throughout the industry.  And that is this:  The historic pattern of bargaining, in which a union gives in one round with full expectations that they’ll get it back plus more the next time, is history.  In the past, airline labor agreements addressed only the competitive realities confined within the 48 contiguous U.S. states to the extent they addressed competitive realities at all.  Today, union leaders need to accept that this is no longer the case. Airlines cannot cave to the urge to repeat the patterned sins of the past and give away pay without demanding changes necessary to compete with new and different competition.  At the same time management must listen carefully and think creatively about addressing labor’s concerns about jobs in a different but an increasingly global competitive industry.

Bates’ Five Paragraphs of Truth

I'm going to tell it straight. For the past several years, APA has played the blame game. We've blamed management, we've blamed the National Mediation Board and we've blamed the recession. We've portrayed ourselves as victims of an unfair world.

It's time we look in the mirror and get honest with ourselves. In APA's extensive contract proposal crafted several years ago, we opened on a large number of items in nearly every section of our contract. Instead of concentrating on the most immediate and important items, we created a wish list for a "dream contract," asking for dramatic increases throughout the contract. We loaded up the openers with "throwaways" and put hundreds of items on the table--of which approximately 320 still remain.

We told the whole world that we didn't know or care how much our demands cost. We said we didn't care what was going on with the economy or with the corporation's economics. We didn't consult with professional negotiators. We abandoned working within established industry protocols and severed ties with management.

These are some of the reasons the NMB and the United States government put APA in recess. The NMB told us to clean up our act. They told us that it does matter how much our "demands" cost, to quit bickering over internal governance and that we needed a leader who was empowered to make decisions. They were clear that APA's radical rhetoric had isolated us and that APA did not have many friends in Washington. They were concerned that the APA Negotiating Committee had no authority to bargain and that much of what they brought back was rejected. Lastly, when I was first elected APA President, the NMB was very direct in stating that there appeared to be no one in charge at the union. The NMB considered APA a basket case and no longer wished to waste resources. Fortunately for us, much of this has now been reversed.

Since our openers, we have refused to remove any items from the table and come off any of our more "interesting" demands. To do so--according to some--would be "negotiating against ourselves," or so the mantra goes. But what we've really done is to paint ourselves into a corner, thereby playing right into management's hands. We've given them the tools to slow negotiations down as much as they want. After five years, we still haven't had any serious negotiations on some of the most important items such as scope, pay, retro, stagnation and others. At the rate we are going, we could literally spend the next decade in negotiations.

Bates concludes, “It's time we get serious about clearing out the underbrush. Our pilots want an industry-leading contract now--not years from now.”

The full text of Captain Bates’ speech can be found on Terry Maxon’s Airline Biz Blog at the Dallas Morning News. 

The hard work of fixing labor relations and contracts in the airline industry must begin with clearing the underbrush  -- a  task that must be done before an efficient use of the National Mediation Board (NMB) can commence.  Using the services of the NMB to “work through” issues with the uniform section is grossly inefficient.  Nonetheless, that is how it seems many negotiating teams are using the Board. Reaching impasse on the uniform section [cynical emphasis added] does not constitute having reached the conditions for a release.

As the Dunlop II Commission recommended, both parties had best be working hard toward a resolution of the issues before a release is considered/granted.  Bates understands this clearly.

As I write this, I can hear the hue and cry from his union brethren that, with his speech, Bates is acting like a management lackey.  But that is simply naïve.  Negotiations require a back and forth on issues important to each party.  That’s the way it’s supposed to work. Changing course from the discredited reliance on “pattern bargaining” does not signal defeat.  It merely recognizes that the old way is not working toward reaching a agreement.

Every union has its minority factions that want to “burn the furniture” before they’re ready to sign a deal on the house.  That is a strategy that has proven in this round to not work.  Captain Bates is from a domicile at American, Miami, known to be a home to the union’s Taliban.  That faction will certainly scream.  But the professional airmen at American deserve better than the prior administration and maybe, just maybe, they will accomplish their ultimate goal of getting a leading contract.

This Wednesday, February 16 I will be speaking at the FAA Aviation Forecast Conference in remarks I’m calling: The US Airline Industry and Herbert Stein’s Law.  If you are not familiar with Herbert Stein’s Law, then give it a google.  More to come . . .

Monday
Dec272010

Time to Look Forward – Not Back

Historically,www.swelblog.com has taken space this time of the year to reflect on the biggest stories of the year. In this column, I want instead to spend more time looking at issues that will be important in 2011.

First, the look back: 2010 began with me taking sides in the battle for JAL and siding with the ultimate victor, American.  We wrote about the National Mediation Board, wondered aloud whether the labor-friendly Obama Administration would permit an airline strike given the fragility of the economy. We challenged Captain John Prater, President of the Air Line Pilots Association, on multiple fronts, offered a favorable perspective of the controversial Chairman and CEO of United Airlines, Glenn Tilton, and looked at mainline pilot scope and the pilot unions’ associated rhetoric. We challenged Southwest to put its money where its mouth was in the proposed slot swap between Delta and US Airways and noted Continental’s contract offer to its pilots that offered Delta wage rates plus $1 per hour. We laid out why we did not like the proposed United – US Airways merger; criticized the tarmac delay rule, pondered the American and jetBlue tie up at New York’s JFK airport; applauded the United and Continental merger and argued that American and US Airways will be fine in a consolidated world – at least for the foreseeable future.  We questioned why the airline industry was losing numerous battles in Washington, the looming threat from carriers in the Middle East,  the price of regulation in terms of what is a public good and lobbed yet another challenge to now ex-Congressman James Oberstar. We also weighed in on the Export-Import Bank; the Southwest – AirTran merger; the national elections; and questioned the need for the number of commercial air service airports in use today. We explained why pilot picketing and other union activity revealed only part of the labor quandary at US carriers, and predicted that foreign ownership restrictions will be the subject of ongoing debate.

Meanwhile, we only touched on airline profitability – a nice change, but noted with caution as three quarters do not make a trend. The airlines are doing what they should be doing in de-leveraging their balance sheets, with consolidation occurring not just in the mainline sector, but beginning to reshape the regional sector as well.  Oil was less of an issue in 2010, with price volatility muted compared to the prior two years. And the revenue picture brightened, particularly coming off a dismal 2009.  Finally we saw pivotal votes rejecting unionization at Delta, although the jury is still out whether labor’s defeat there was due to something unique to Delta or a broader referendum on a union’s ability to improve the lives of dues-paying members

Thanks to all of you who are regular readers and those who check in occasionally, readership was up significantly in 2010 and I hope you continue to read in 2011.

LOOKING FORWARD:

LABOR:  Labor promises to remain a significant story in the coming year.  There is new leadership at the Air Line Pilots Association; the Allied Pilots Association; and the AFA-CWA to name a few.  While it is hard to predict whether things will change at the largest flight attendant union, AFA-CWA, after multiple terms under Patricia Friend, I am confident that changes in leadership will benefit the pilots represented by both ALPA and the APA.  This is not to say that I expect either of the unions to roll over, but believe that there is much to gain for both sides in a constructive dialogue that was too often absent in the previous union administrations. It is safe to say that the terms served by Captains Prater and Hill did more to set the unions back than advance the pilot profession.

The NMB will remain on my watch list.  We could see action sooner rather than later at American, where Larry Gibbons, Director of the Office of Mediation Services, will now oversee the negotiations that have been underway for several years. Will the NMB become even more political as Gibbons sits closer to the board members than do other members of the team he oversees?  Will the Board play a crucial role in facilitating new and joint agreements at Continental – United?  Will the Board side with the unions in determining whether Delta interfered in the IAM and AFA representation elections as the unions allege? Ultimately, the unions will determine how aggressive they need to be to leverage the support of employees at the merged carriers anxious about recent changes in working conditions and how the seniority list is constructed.

It is clear that the industry will be watching as Delta manages one of the least-unionized workforces, particularly as former union members from Northwest are brought into the fold. One might say that the hard work is now done as the votes have been cast and the election is over.  But I say the hard work is just now beginning.  It won’t be that long until another election can be called.  And the difficulty of the task is highlighted by the civil war between the work groups at US Airways that continues into yet another year.  It seems unlikely that the legal issues dividing the merged pilot groups and pilots and management are near resolution. All eyes will be on United CEO Jeff Smisek and Southwest CEO Gary Kelly to see how they manage culture change at their bigger, more complex carriers.

Finally, look for organizing activity to increase at other airlines.  The losses at Delta will make the unions hungry for increased membership and recent changes to federal election law under the Railway Labor Act make it easier for union to win a secret ballot election.  Already unions are targeting jetBlue and SkyWest –where unions lost past elections under the old rules.  If the Delta vote is a referendum on the former Northwest employees not being content with their union, might there not be opportunities for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters to begin raiding select work groups?

FUEL:  As I write, West Texas Intermediate is trading at $91+ per barrel.  As Southwest CEO Gary Kelly, put it, volatility in fuel prices is the industry’s “No. 1 challenge” and “the single biggest threat to aviation.”

The price of oil is sure to be a story in 2011.  Goldman Sachs, the firm that predicted $200 per barrel oil in 2008, is predicting $100 per barrel during the first half of 2011.  Given growing confidence that economic recovery is finally taking hold and the levels of new industrial production activity in the Asia-Pacific region that often drives market oil prices, $100 per barrel seems reasonable. 

Here at Swelblog, we were among the first to suggest that the best thing that happened to the US and global airline industries was oil at $147 per barrel, which more than anything else served as the impetus to reduce capacity from an industry that had grown too big.  If oil prices continue to climb, it will serve as a discipline on any efforts to add marginal capacity to the system, particularly in the domestic market.  And this time around, a Southwest does not enjoy the same hedge book and fuel cost saving potential v. the industry as it had when oil prices surged in the 2004 – 2008 period. 

Should oil continue its rise, we will begin to see further reductions in small community air service.  For many communities, a fuel surcharge on top of what many believe are high fares will test the price elasticity of even the more inelastic customers - who will take to the highway as their first point of access to the air transportation grid.  This would be a healthy outcome for the industry that is still arguably over-connected.  Rising oil prices – along with regulation imposed costs that will come to fruition in 2011 - should be a catalyst for continued consolidation in the regional sector.

If fuel prices rise, the passenger carriers will likely be successful imposing fuel surcharges to fares, just as the cargo carriers were in the past.  Southwest may not charge for bags, but even they will have to consider fuel surcharges this time around.  That is a big differentiator for the US airline industry in 2011.  What makes this tricky is that the US consumer was long conditioned to paying fares based on industry costs of $30 per barrel in-the-wing jet fuel.  The industry has adapted.  At $95 per barrel the industry begins to be tested yet again.

WASHINGTON:   the Air Transport Association has a new leader in Nicholas E. Calio, a former Citicorp executive with keen bipartisan skills. Calio becomes the new President and CEO of the industry’s trade group on January 1, 2011, hoping to turn the airline industry fortunes after some trying legislative and regulatory losses in 2010.  With new costs and operating constraints posed by rigid new tarmac delay rules, increased passenger compensation for overbooking, a new push to have a total cost of trip (fare and fees) made known to the purchaser, proposed constraints on regional carriers,  changes at the NMB, investigative actions by the FAA, the rejection of the slot swaps between US Airways and Delta, and the loss on appeal of the right of airports to implement congestion pricing, airlines are hoping for kinder, gentler treatment in Washington in the new year.

In a recent media release, the ATA said it was pleased with the recommendations of Secretary LaHood’s Future of Aviation Advisory Committee.  I am assuming this will prove to be a blueprint agenda for Calio and his team at ATA.

And with Oberstar now gone from the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, new Chairman John Mica (R-FL) has an opportunity to make some headway on relevant and important issues that threatened to make US aviation a second-tier player in the global industry under the misguided direction of the former chairman.

I am encouraged by the leadership changes taking place in the industry and hope that we can finally have a discussion on issues with a mindset on positioning the industry within the global sphere.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The industry’s work is far from done.  Progress on consolidation, cutting capacity, new technologies and efficiencies, and re-balancing labor costs have dramatically improved the cost structure in the industry, just as anti-trust immunity, open skies agreements and global partnerships have improved revenue opportunities for US carriers. But work must continue on alternative fuels and reducing the impact of aviation on the environment and ensuring that the airline industry is not paying more than its fair share of the tax burden.

There are still barriers to better operations on the labor front as well. Union leaders need to decide once and for all how to address the split between mainline and regional flying all the while securing/maintaining some form of scope protection their members expect.  A good start would be to stop the charade that this is a 76-seat issue.  The mainline does not want that flying because they will not accept the rates necessary to do the flying.  Once again, labor did much to create the problem, now it is time that they figure out how best to fix it.

Finally, it is time to stop playing politics with the FAA Authorization bill and put together a clean bill to address the aviation infrastructure.  Let’s get rid of the pet projects loaded into a bill that should be designed for efficiency.  And airlines and airports need to figure out how to work together.  The debate should not be about an increase in the PFC but the extent to which the industry has a say in how the money is spent.  Just as airlines need to be positioning themselves to succeed in a global industry, airports that add little to no value to the airline map of tomorrow should not be spending precious money building out an infrastructure that may not be used.

Let’s hope that in 2011, we can stop living in the past and look toward a strong future for the US airline industry. We have to get our impediments fixed at home to prepare for the next upcoming competitive battle for advantage in the global market.  For some this next competitive battle will be much tougher to win.

Happy New Year. 

Tuesday
Nov022010

Swelblog: On Election Morn

This has been a busy month for the US airline industry with earnings and all.  As a result there has been lots of news and most of it good. Of course, two quarters do not make a trend -- something I'm frequently reminding people when I'm out on the road speaking on all things airline industry. 

So as we sit awaiting results on what promises to be a most interesting mid-term election, I want to look back on what has been a very political two years

First up: labor. Unions are all politics all of the time and that has played a big role in the airline industry since President Obama took office.  A cynic would say -- and I might agree -- that unions are simplistic organizations that too often focus on only on the next contract or the next election.  The result is too often a strategy in which they do everything they can to “choke the golden goose” for all of the pay and benefits possible at the time, which only puts their successors in the difficult position of presiding over concessions when the "gains" are no longer economically viable. There are some who say that this blog is too quick to bash unions.  But as I've said before, I'm equal opportunity in calling out bad behavior when I see it. And when it comes to airline labor leadership, I've seen a lot of it.

I've spent a lot of time challenging the leadership at the two largest pilot unions: Captain Lloyd Hill of the Allied Pilots Association and John Prater of the Air Line Pilots Association, both who ended their terms as president this year.  My fundamental criticism was each man’s decision to run on the opportunistic platform that all concessions would be returned and more.  Unrealistic.  Unfortunate.  Unfulfilled.

Lo and behold, the two important pilot unions have replaced “over promise and under deliver” with two new but seasoned presidents: Captain David Bates at the APA and Captain Lee Moak at ALPA.  [Moak has been the subject of much commentary on this blog and I encourage you to learn more about him].  I had the opportunity to spend time with both men last week at the Boyd Group International’s 15th Annual Aviation Forecast Summit in New Orleans.

I don’t want warm and fuzzy from union leaders and I don't expect it from management. What I want is a sense that each side understands and negotiates with a clear understanding of the economic environment in which the industry operates.  From both pilot leaders I am confident that principled negotiations and decisions will be the rule of the day.  From both pilot leaders I sense a potential to depart from gridlock and enter disciplined negotiations.  From management I want to see a renewed effort on communicating clearly the rigors of the business from a global perspective.  That would be true leadership.

Unions and management must break through the gridlock that leads to protracted contract talks and ultimately keeps money from pilots' pockets.  And both sides need to be honest with pilots about the extent to which the world has changed and the industry continues to change with it.  For example, today’s union negotiations should be less about who should fly 76-seat small jets and more about how to position an airline to challenge new and vigorous competition in Latin America, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific regions. For the mainline carriers, competition is now more about Dubai than Duluth, and more about Auckland than Austin.

It is fast becoming clear that flight attendant union leaders are also increasingly out of touch.  And no one is more out of touch than the President of the Association of Professional Flight Attendants President Laura Glading. Glading, more than any union leader in the past or present, is too quick to threaten chaos and strikes without a clear understanding of the competitive realities that affect contract negotiations.

In her latest unconscionable act, Glading is calling on American Airlines flight attendants to write letters demanding a release to a "cooling off period" and possible strike from the National Mediation Board. Maybe Glading doesn't really understand the Board and its mission which, last I checked, is to try to prevent work actions that would threaten the nation's air transport system. Further, it would be unconscionable if the NMB were to cave into a letter writing campaign by a union that has done more to cause dissension in its ranks than promote the high level of customer service and professionalism the airline needs to compete. 

It has been interesting to watch the flight attendant negotiations at Continental and United. The Continental flight attendants actually voted down a tentative agreement that would have put money in their pockets immediately at a time the industry remains vulnerable economically. "Immediately" should have been an important factor considering that there will need be a representation election between the AFA-CWA and the IAM before any real negotiations can begin at the merged carrier.  My guess is that it could now take a couple of years before either the Continental or United flight attendants realize any economic gains over what they earn today.

As for negotiations with under-the-wing employees other than mechanics, the TWU negotiations at American provide a lens for one of the most difficult issues facing airlines: how to appropriately compensate ground workers.  In almost every case, this work could be outsourced for a fraction of the costs of keeping the work "in house" -- particularly when you consider the comparatively rich benefits package most airline employees receive. The baggage handlers are the most vulnerable yet the union group still holds out with demands for more. 

But if the unions may have a false sense of power because the worst-kept secret in the airline industry is the fact that baggage handlers have long ridden the coattails of the more skilled mechanic group, demanding wages that far exceed what these workers could command outside the airline industry. Said another way, because the skilled mechanic group has "carried" these less-skilled workers for so long, they have received less in negotiations over the years because the political structures of the TWU and the IAM includes baggage handlers in the same "class and craft" as a way to boost their ranks.

This week we will know the outcome of vote of the Delta and Northwest flight attendants, who are deciding whether to organize under the AFA-CWA banner (which would be a first for Delta flight attendants) or be a non-union group.  This election is the biggest yet under a new NMB rule that made the most significant change to the union election process under the Railway Labor Act in 75 years. That new rule likely will be the deciding factor in the outcome.  The change in the rule was all about politics, with a clear disregard for prior practice and arrogance in its refusal to address key subjects in the labor arena, including the ability of employees to decertify a union.

But that is reality in Washington today as it pertains to the airline industry.  We have had a number of issues become political in the name of consumer protection.  There are a number of matters being regulated or legislated in the name of safety.   A FAA Reauthorization bill cannot get passed because of all the non-FAA issues lawmakers stuck in the Senate and House versions as goodies for their own political constituencies.  But no matter the outcome of the national elections tomorrow, gridlock promises to rule the day in Washington for the next two years as well.

As British author Ernest Benn wrote:  “Politics is the art of looking for trouble, finding whether it exists or not, diagnosing it incorrectly, and applying the wrong remedy.”  That sums up how Washington deals with an industry that delivers value and jobs to the economy each and every day.

Tuesday
Oct132009

US Pilot Unions’ Dirty Little Secrets

I keep waiting for real leadership to emerge from labor unions in the US airline industry, particularly from pilot unions.  During past down cycles, pilot unions could be found taking the lead in creating a nuanced solution that addressed a company’s competitive needs and the concerns of pilots they represent.  The template crafted by pilot union leaders in the past often formed the framework for companies seeking help from the non-pilot workforce.

Today, more often than not, I see the work of pilot unions doing more to pose a barrier to an airline’s success than to promote it.  To be fair, the unions at Delta, Alaska and Southwest get credit for smart leadership. But the same can’t be said at other airlines, and here’s one reason why.

The legacy carriers all operate as part of networks that have formed over time, through mergers; asset buys; regulatory frameworks; and, importantly, union influence.  By this I refer in part to the dirty little secret in pilot union contracts: “scope” clauses that too often hamstring an airline’s operations in the name of job protection for pilots.

The question we in the industry should be asking is whether those scope clauses are really serving that purpose or, rather, whether some union leaders are using them in a way that is both misguided and harmful to the pilots they represent.

Evolve, Adapt, Reinvent – Or Risk Irrelevance

The ability of mainline carriers to employ regional jets is not new to the industry.  Neither is the ability of mainline carriers to engage in international code sharing arrangements with foreign airlines.   Both activities are governed by scope clauses in each carrier’s collective bargaining agreements with pilot unions. And before we go any further, let’s remember that the language in these collective bargaining agreements is just that – collectively bargained between the management and the unions. 

Much of what I have written at swelblog.com over the past two years has probably earned my picture a place on the dartboard at most pilot union offices. And this column is not intended to resurrect my image with certain pilot leaders in any way.  It’s just that union presidents are really the CEOs of their organizations and they deserve the same scrutiny as do airline CEOs.

And yes, I’ll name names. One is Captain Lloyd Hill who is president of the Allied Pilots Association – which represents only the pilots of American Airlines.  Another is John Prater, president of the Air Line Pilots Association, which represents pilots across the industry. After watching Captain Hill’s misguided attempts to garner leverage for AA pilots during contract negotiations and Captain Prater’s recent embarrassing diatribes before the House Aviation Subcommittee’s hearings on aviation safety, even I feel sympathy for the pilots they attempt to represent.

Captain Lloyd Hill

In the early days of the blog, I wrote a lot about American Airlines and its strained relations with the APA’s Hill administration.  The union was antagonistic toward the company from the very start and began negotiations with an outrageous opening proposal that demanded, among other things, a pay increase of more than 50 percent. I suggested then that it would be a long time before a deal will be reached with these players at the table. 

Two full years later, there is not only no deal, but not even the scent of a deal in the air.  And from my read of the contract cases now before the National Mediation Board, I could make a case that it will be at least two more years before American and the APA reach agreement or a NMB-declared impasse is declared.  But I will leave it to the APA membership and the Las Vegas odds makers to analyze what needs to change in order to improve the odds of a new working agreement.

Never before in my experience have I seen a more misdirected, miscalculated and mismanaged mess of a negotiation by a union.  And because we can all read Hill’s playbook and it’s clear he’s not moving the ball down the field, he keeps going back to his current whipping boy -- the “immunized alliance” the company is trying to achieve through a joint business agreement with British Airways and Iberia.  After calling the same play on second and third down, I am thinking that this fourth down attempt will result in a loss as well. 

Last week the APA issued yet another press release urging the DOT to dismiss American’s application. But this time, the APA was joined in its hollow and transparent opposition by ALPA.   In this case, ALPA was less strident, choosing not to oppose alliances generally but instead to urge DOT to ensure that jobs at US airlines are not eroded as a result of international partnerships.

“As a result of two significant developments during the past several days, we urge the DOT to decline American Airlines’ application for worldwide antitrust immunity,” Hill said in the APA release. “The first of those developments was the EC’s announcement earlier this month that American Airlines’ plans may violate rules governing restrictive business practices. Given those stated concerns, we question the advisability of granting approval to a deal that may fail to pass muster with the DOT’s European counterparts.

“Closer to home, American Airlines management has refused to provide industry-standard job protections for our pilots, despite APA’s concerted efforts,” Hill added. “We can only conclude that our worst fears would be realized in the event American Airlines is permitted to proceed with what amounts to a virtual merger with British Airways and Iberia.

No Captain Hill, your worst fears should not be this alliance.  You see, your contract permits this arrangement and if this type of commercial activity were to be prohibited, your actions in fighting the alliance will all but ensure fewer US jobs – they may be primarily narrowbody jobs but US jobs nonetheless.  Maybe you should begin negotiating with the company with realistic and market-sensitive proposals rather than filing petty grievance after grievance that has resulted in a further weakening of your negotiating position.  Maybe you should stop putting up billboards openly criticizing your employer on product reliability and safety issues because trying to hurt the company that employs your members is no good path to trying to improve their contract.  

Maybe the goal of “restoring the profession” should be to recognize a changed environment and figure out how best the members you represent can prosper under the new economic reality.  

Maybe your dirty little secret is that you do not know how to tell your members that your strategy to “restore the profession” has failed.  But the real sad part is the real losers are the professional aviators who deserve better from their union leaders.

Captain John Prater

Over at ALPA, the world’s largest pilot union, we have John Prater at the helm. Prater won the election to head ALPA by beating out his predecessor, the very skilled and seasoned Duane Woerth, on a platform that overpromised and is sure to under-deliver. Over the years some of the very best union leaders in the airline business have come from ALPA:  J.J. O’Donnell; Hank Duffy; Randy Babbitt and Woerth to name a few, and that doesn’t include a line of great leaders during the union’s formative years.

Now we have ALPA testifying before Congress in ways that are not becoming of past ALPA leaders.  Prater testified at the September 23 hearing on the crash of Colgan Air 3407 about a number of safety initiatives ALPA is promoting across the regional spectrum. But he also spoke about the relationship between mainline carriers and their regional partners in a way I find troubling.

Prater attributed what he called the “low-experience pilot problem” to the mainline airlines’ business model. 

“Mainline airlines are frequently faced with pressures on their marketing plans that result in the use of the regional feed code-share partners, whether they be economic, passenger demand or essential air service,” he said. “These code-share or fee-for-departure (FFD) contracts with smaller or regional airlines provide this service and feed the mainline carriers through their hub cities.”

Before mainline airlines had regional partners, Prater said, all flying was done by the pilots of an airline on a single pilot-seniority list, where pilots were trained to and met the same higher-than-minimum regulatory standards."

“A safety benefit is derived from all flying being done from a single pilot-seniority list because it requires that first officers fly with many captains and learn from their experience and wisdom before becoming captains themselves,” Prater said.

Now, he argued, major airlines use multiple, regional “vendor” carriers to drive down their costs, a practice he said “harms safety”  because first officers on regional airlines can become captains within a year and “fail to gain the experience and judgment needed to safely act in that capacity.”

Prater goes on:  “When a regional airline operates a route for a mainline carrier and offers subpar wages and benefits, only low-experience pilots, who cannot qualify for a job with a better paying airline, are typically willing to accept such employment. It is not uncommon that training at such carriers is conducted only to FAA-required minimums. However, these low-experience pilots obviously need more training than more experienced airline pilots to gain equivalent knowledge of the operating environment, aircraft, and procedures before flying the line.”

Later, in questioning by members of the committee, Prater insinuated that airlines involved in the crash, as well as other carriers that ALPA is in contract negotiations with, are continuing work practices that may compromise safety.

"The managements at Pinnacle and Colgan have not changed their ways. The management at Trans States Airlines haven't changed their ways. Do I need to go further? I have a big book," Prater told the subcommittee. He then suggested that carriers were actually punishing Captains that report maintenance issues with their aircraft, concluding: "Some managements are still insisting that they are going to beat their pilots into submission."

What Prater fails to share is ALPA’s dirty little secret: that the wage rates, working conditions, training provisions and other particulars he criticizes were negotiated by his union. ALPA represents the majority of regional pilots flying in the US today.  So maybe ALPA needs to step up and take some responsibility for its contribution to building this sector of the industry.  Only by agreeing to lower rates of pay and more flying time at the regional carriers can ALPA justify and sustain the generous pay, benefits and work rules that benefit pilots at the mainline airlines. 

Look at any significant relaxation of the scope clause at the mainline carrier that allows the airline to increase its use of jets 70 seats or less. In just about every case the mainline pilots received a significant pay boost in return for that “concession.”

The fact is that ALPA has played a major role in creating the labor Ponzi scheme that survives at the legacy airlines. How does ALPA find a way to pay another group of new pilots less in order to buy “better” contracts for the regional pilots it now represents? It can’t. And you can bet that ALPA would not ask its mainline pilots to take a pay cut to help increase the wages for pilots flying at their regional counterparts.  A conundrum indeed.

Concluding Thoughts

Labor leaders in the pilot ranks would have you believe that this (international code sharing and the use of regional flying) is all about management abusing provisions of their collective bargaining agreements to enrich their shareholders.  In fact, the creation of B-Scale constructs and the relaxation of scope provisions has been labor’s “quid” in return for increases in compensation and benefits for 20+ years [the “quo].”  Even when the industry economics suggested the quo was too much.  As I have said here before, labor likes to “eat their young.”  This is an issue that is fundamental to the difficulty of today’s negotiating environment.

Hill and Prater are resorting to 1920’s tactics rather than trying to lead pilots in a new world of airline economics. Labor’s “Old New Deal” cannot be supported by today’s competitive environment.  What is needed is a “New New Deal”. It will not look anything like the “Old New Deal” to be sure.  Just as airline executives have been forced to adapt to new economics shaping the industry, labor, too, must adapt because it has no more young to consume to keep senior pilots fat and happy.

It is hard to be at the top - whether looking for necessary capital or creatively searching to support the expectations of pilots.    

Friday
Sep182009

Nibbling on a Little Crow While Watching Eagles Fly

Yep, I was one of those observers not long ago suggesting that the current revenue environment would challenge certain carriers’ liquidity.  While not specific on those carriers I believed to be marginal, the supposition was always US Airways, United and American.  In that order.  Of the three, it was understood that American had more options as it had not yet played the cash for miles card. 

Well, that story played out yesterday when AMR announced that it had secured $2.9 billion in new financing, in part by selling a billion dollars worth of frequent flier miles to Citigroup. Meanwhile United is hinting that more liquidity raising efforts are ahead and Delta is in the market for $500 million.  American’s announcement makes it clear that the credit window remains open for carriers that have quality unencumbered assets to pledge and a reputation for paying their bills. But, I remain unconvinced that the window will stay open for all carriers operating today. 

The same day, American announced network and fleet changes I see as important steps the carrier is taking as a decision nears on its immunized alliance with British Airways. Those changes also can be read as important to the ability of American to forge a closer relationship with JAL. 

The Changing Face of the Domestic Market

While St. Louis has been a hub in name only for American in recent years, yesterday’s announcement that it would stop serving 20 cities out of Lambert and reduce departures to 36 per day pretty much provides the final eulogy for the former TWA.  Now if Delta would only do what it should and pull Cincinnati down to a similar size, much of the necessary work on dismantling unnecessary and redundant secondary, mid-continent hubs will be done. 

Unlike Delta, American has historically owned a strong position in New York; therefore, its announced changes to that critical dot on the airline map were minimal.  And assuming that American’s immunized alliance is granted, New York promises to be one supremely competitive market between STAR, SkyTeam and oneworld carriers in each the domestic and international markets.

Speaking of Alliances

American has absolutely no choice but to counter Delta’s rumored bid for JAL.  The opportunity to make London and Tokyo bookends to a focused domestic network provides the airline the opportunity to finally take advantage of Asia and sell Europe, Africa and the Middle East like their aligned peers. 

It’s no secret that US legacy carriers have their problems. But trust me when I say that the US carriers are productive, nimble and agile when compared to JAL.  At this point, it appears that American would be working in cooperation with, British Airways and Qantas to court the Japanese airline.

JAL needs major surgery.  But assuming that JAL survives the procedure, its recovery requires a presence in all major world regions.  That is why I like the fact that each of the critical players in the oneworld alliance are involved.  As Japan is almost certain to become an open skies country in the coming months, a healthier and allied JAL is critical.

For those concerned about competition in Tokyo, let’s not forget the presence of STAR in the form of ANA.  For those crying about poor little Delta, let’s not forget that Delta remains the largest single carrier in the world in terms of revenue.  For those that may cry foul over competition in the North Pacific, let’s not forget about Delta’s SkyTeam relationship with Korean.  And a case can be made that Seoul has become a more powerful hub than Tokyo largely because of JAL’s weakness and Korea’s aggressiveness. 

Lots of Happenings at American

This latest news is interesting in part because American has been forced to make many changes the hard way as its competitors cut costs through bankruptcy.   American has managed through crisis after crisis all the while toting around a cost and an alliance disadvantage versus most of its legacy peers.  Moving to renew its fleet in the midst of a nasty economic cycle is bold. 

But more impressive to me is the steady, targeted focus on the balance sheet that made yesterday’s liquidity raise possible. It’s not all pretty there. Management continues to struggle to come to agreement with unions on new contracts that won’t exacerbate the company’s competitive disadvantages, and that’s all the harder when union leaders continue to make demands that could not and cannot be met given the competitive environment.

Making this even harder is explaining that the improved liquidity position is only because of borrowing, not that the company has suddenly found the recipe for outsized profits.   

Labor:  This Is a $2.9 Billion DIP Loan……Without the Consequences for You

It is safe to say that no other US carrier could accomplish this type of a capital raise at this time.  Any near-term concerns that analysts or observers might have about American’s ability to meet its obligations should be quelled.  Clearly American management believes in the company’s future or it would not be investing in it.  After all, the quest of any company is to produce a return on that capital.

American just leveraged the future.  And if I am a union leader there I would want to tie my industry-best lot among the US legacy airline world to the carrier that just put its money where its mouth is.  To continue resisting changes critical to the company’s future profitability only leads to the propagation of the status quo. 

Yes, I’d make some demands. When the economy and the industry do recover, I would insist that some of my members’ earnings are tied to company performance.  That is real leverage – not the illusory leverage unions try to create by promoting the false belief that past concessions and 1990’s wages relative to inflation should be restored in an industry vastly changed.

There is ultimately going to be a recovery.  Like American’s decision to order aircraft anticipating the recovery, if I am labor at American I would want to get my negotiations done sooner rather than later.  Just think how little incentive there will be for companies to conclude negotiations during an economic upturn given the losses suffered over the past 8 years.  As I have written before, I am astounded at how much time labor spends negotiating downside protections versus provisions that enable the members they represent to participate financially on the upside – a scenario that promises much more than any negotiated increase in wage rates.

More on this. 

 

 

Wednesday
Apr152009

Liquidity, Labor and Legislation

Earnings season is upon us and we all anxiously await guidance from airline executives on a forward looking basis. On the eve of past earning seasons, cues from industry executives have mostly used words starting with “C.” This time around, I want to hear commentary on topics starting with “L” namely:

Liquidity

I believe that we are nearing the final chapters for one carrier, possibly two. I do not know which they might be, only that there are not enough rabbits left in the hat for every airline to survive in this market.

Why?

- Because labor will not be the internal source of capital that it has been in the past;
- Fuel costs are uncontrollable;
- Maintenance repair and overhaul will not offer hundreds of millions of dollars in savings in the future as most airlines already have outsourced as much of that business as they can;
- Distribution costs already have been wrung out of the system at every airline;
- Airport costs ebb and flow with the level of traffic;
- Aircraft rentals and other vendor contracts are largely fixed;
- Commitments made to feed providers are contractual;
- Interest obligations are known.

In other words, there just is not much room on the income statement for airlines to maneuver.

In the U.S. airline industry, we could be fast approaching the tipping point– the critical juncture in an evolving situation that leads to a new and irreversible development. With credit tight, would you put money into an industry that has historically destroyed capital? Would you bankroll an industry that has few opportunities to reduce costs in a weak economy? Would you lend money to companies facing labor strife? To get to the bottom line, would you invest in a company in an industry that has never made a dime? In this economy, there may not be many takers.

The airline industry is not special. Like other industries, it needs a plan to earn at least its cost of capital and compete for a limited pool of funding. And those who hold the capital will likely look first toward companies and industries that reward their capital providers more than once or twice every two decades.

I share the belief of some others that the domestic market may be stabilizing, but think this recovery will be an uneven one. The real driver may be the international market and the global economy’s interdependencies that I do not pretend to fully grasp. So I have concerns about American, Continental, Delta and United. Asia has been troubled in certain spots for nearly a decade now. Europe was a strong performer while the US industry faltered, but now shows signs of weakness across the continent. And Latin America’s economy appears to be similarly troubled.

Beginning today, when American leads the first quarter’s earnings parade, I will be all ears. Because what I see for some is troubling. Others will benefit from the weakness.

 

Labor

The recalcitrant unions at American remain the lead story as outlined in Mike Esterl’s piece in an April 14 Wall Street Journal entitled: Labor Negotiations Cloud Outlook for American Airlines Parent. American is being joined by United which opens negotiations with all of its major unions this month. Between the two, there will be plenty to read and write about as union leaders at each airline continue to promise outcomes to their members that could not be met even in the best of times. Real leadership would instead recognize that no airline can long survive overpriced labor contracts that put them at a competitive disadvantage in the industry.

I read somewhere this week that the United Airlines flight attendants union is promising its members a new contract that will give them industry-leading pay rates. The American pilots union is taking an old page out of the Continental pilots’ playbook that “the loan is due” to gain back pay levels the industry no longer supports. The problem is that concessions granted or forced in past years were a necessary correction of market costs that had risen above the industry’s ability to absorb those costs. Those concessions were never a “loan” and there isn’t a labor contract in the industry that includes terms on rates or principal that would make them so.

American has a first – at least in my recollection – in having all of its negotiations in mediation at the same time. United could be in the same place as date certain contractual understandings are in place to file for mediation in the event no agreement is reached. As for US Airways and the labor unions that have not been able to complete an agreement following the airline’s merger with America West, I have given up trying to apply logic to that situation. The damage done to employees is done and that was the work of the unions involved.

OhhhhhhBama – Release Me (And Let Me Love Again)

The Allied Pilots Association, which represents American pilots, has been on an ill-conceived, death-march strategy that the leadership somehow believes will get them closer to a release from mediation. Negotiations began in September 2006 -- a long haul by any perspective – but the clock was reset when a new union president, Lloyd Hill, was elected in June 2007. I don’t pretend to know the union’s strategy in these negotiations beyond what plays out publicly, but I do know that the Hill administration has made contract demands that are so far removed from reality that I question whether he is really representing the best interests of AA pilots.

With each union that files for mediation, my guess is the American pilots move yet another group down the pecking order for a release and thus the ability to engage in Self Help. The APA should be taking a clue from the Obama administration and its dealings with the UAW. The UAW’s Gettelfinger demonstrated a real understanding of that industry in balancing the interests of his members with the economic reality, in part by working to preserve wages and benefits of current employees by negotiating lower rates for new employees. But even that didn’t change the reality that, as the economy continues to collapse; the UAW is still not close to having moved far enough from work rules and wage rates that put the Big Three at a huge cost disadvantage in the global auto industry.

Finally, to the pilot leadership, I can’t imagine what possible benefit you would gain through strikes or other work actions that few airlines could survive. First, there is little chance the White House would allow a union at a carrier the size of American or United or Continental to actually go on strike and potentially threaten the economy’s ability to recover. No matter how labor friendly the new administration is, I believe that any union will need to make a pretty powerful case to the White House as to why a strike is more important than the recovery of the United States economy. Any union that can make a case that restoration of inflation-adjusted wages can be easily paid for by the airlines may have a chance, but that’s going to be a tough case to make.

I refer to the American pilots union in this example, but it applies to any large airline. Too much stimulus is potentially threatened by a strike in an industry as crucial to commerce as the airline industry.

Here’s my bet on where pilot contract negotiations will end up at the legacy airlines: With the Delta deal done under the leadership of ALPA’s Captain Lee Moak, the remaining negotiations will be completed in the following order: 2) Continental; 3) United (following the lead taken in the CO negotiations); 4) US Airways (assuming a final resolution to the seniority issues scheduled for the end of April); and 5) American (and perhaps only after a “leadership” change takes place.)

Congrats to Southwest for having put to bed their negotiation with multiple groups at reasonable rate increases.  With little management distraction, the airline can focus on finding needed revenue.

 

Legislation

Finally, there are legislative issues important to this industry that deserves color in the upcoming earnings calls. First and foremost is a reauthorization bill that will fund the FAA’s activities. A committed industry must find a way to fund enhancements to the air traffic control system. Everyone in the industry recognizes the need to make changes. Now we’re just fighting over who will pay for them. It’s time to move forward and for the various factions to present a united front on "who will pay what".

Second on the legislative front is Oberstar’s bill to evaluate airline alliances every three years -- a clear attempt to make the formation of these alliances increasingly difficult. Never did I think I would write that former AMR Chairman Bob Crandall and Minnesota Congressman Jim Oberstar are on the same page regarding a controversial commercial issue, but I am - and I am even writing it in the same sentence.

In an interview with the National Journal’s Lisa Caruso, Crandall actually says: “In my view, an objective observer would have to look very hard to find a way in which alliances have benefited consumers.” His remarks point to the “dominance” of slots at Frankfurt and Paris by the aligned carriers. Is this any different than the structure "Crandall built" in the US domestic market where carriers were reluctant to offer service between the hubs of a competitor? Absolutely not. Instead, the competition offered a menu of one-stop competing services that presented the consumer a choice.

Are we not to acknowledge that the air travel consumer in Toledo benefited significantly from the Northwest – KLM alliance that offered seamless connecting service to Amsterdam and points beyond? Wasn’t it Crandall that coveted a partner in Brussels to partake in these very same traffic flows? Does Crandall really believe that Detroit and Minneapolis would have multiple non-stop services to Amsterdam if not for the alliance? Does Oberstar really believe that Minneapolis would have the international service to Europe it does without the network of KLM and now Air France on the other end?

Crandall even makes the point that the foreign carriers have been the beneficiaries at the expense of US carrier interests. Crandall is the one that brought the concept of time-of-day departures to the networks of the nation’s carriers. This alone has contributed to a significant amount of the uneconomic capacity that pervades the industry today. Do we really think that all of the departures that “Bob built” were good for anyone? If we did not have alliances to begin filling all of the ill-conceived capacity deployed in Crandall’s domestic network, then we would have even fewer US carrier domestic departures than we do today – even after all of the cuts.

For a guy I admired, Crandall’s comments leave me perplexed, confused and confounded. Some of his fixes are on point, like a changed labor structure. But Crandall should accept some of the blame for an industry struggling today as his pit bull instinct toward competition became a blueprint to build an industry too big. Or maybe he should explain to airline employees that his blueprint caused an industry to hire too many people that now believe they are entitled to wages higher than the industry can pay.

More to come on this one.

Thursday
Oct162008

Aviation News Just Breeds Itself in the Dallas Metroplex

Air Romo breaks his finger on the first play of overtime and is grounded for four weeks. American Airlines reports a profit for the third quarter of 2008; but only after accounting for the sale of American Beacon Advisors. Southwest Airlines posts its first quarterly loss in 17 years; but only after accounting for losses on certain hedge contracts. Had it not been for accounting issues, the news might have been much the same as American would have posted a loss and Southwest would have posted yet another profitable quarter.

But earnings are not “the” story for 2008’s third quarter given the volatility of jet fuel that occurred during a period when the passengers carried largely bought their tickets months ago. The story from the earnings announcements is more about the landscape on a going forward basis. Like many data points we assess and refer to, the Southwest loss deserves an asterisk.

The most interesting news thus far has been American Airlines announcing an order for 100 787-900 aircraft as part of its third quarter discussion. 42 of the aircraft are firm orders and are scheduled for delivery beginning in 2012. As the news came across the wire, I was preparing to give a lecture on networks. It was quite the buzz in the room as many of the students are like you and me and have jet fuel running through their veins.

There are many aspects of this announcement that I find encouraging. First, and simply, a US carrier announced a significant order for new technology as India's airlines consider cancelling orders. Second, and unlike many of the world’s carriers with orders for new aircraft, a US carrier is not ordering at the top of the cycle only to take delivery as the cycle turns down as will prove true with many carriers in Europe and Asia. Third, American did what it should do and make the delivery schedule contingent on a negotiated deal with the Allied Pilots Association.

Terry Maxon of the Dallas Morning News blogs on the APA’s reaction to American’s announcement that it is spending billions on new aircraft that will permit it to connect multiple dots on tomorrow’s global map. Of course the pilots are pleased that the company is investing in new equipment. Of course their reaction comes with the caveat that reinvestment in aircraft is only part of the necessary reinvestment in the airline. As the APA reminds us daily, restoring pay rates to some historical level in their current contract is also a necessary action.

I don’t know about you, but I am tired of the refrain of pay restoration. I am tired of the suggestion that these negotiations began in 2006. They did not. The negotiations began when the new rockers in the Metroplex, “Captain Lloyd and the No Planet Airmen”, took office and made a comprehensive proposal to management that was ultimately priced out at $3 billion dollars.

I have written here often of the need to change existing collective bargaining agreements as language just does not work. Well the APA rightfully points to a glaring reason why we need to rethink the entire labor construct. Pay rates have historically been based on the weight of the aircraft among other inputs. Well the weight of the 787 will be less as it made of composite materials. So now that does not work for the APA and there will have to be another approach.

I have been traveling and speaking again this week, so I missed Trebor Banstetter’s article on Tuesday in the Ft. Worth Star Telegram discussing the status of American's negotiations with its pilots. The APA seems to suggest that the NMB is partially to blame. Remember, as I have written here before: you have to clear the underbrush before a meaningful negotiation can take place on the economics otherwise - just put it on ice. The APA strategy to call for mediation still numbs this observer. I hope that they did not pay anyone for that advice.

But the real piece of information that I find most interesting as I catch up on my reading is a Banstetter blog post suggesting that there is a move on to rein in the national officers at APA. Lloyd and his band have become one song wonders and the membership needs more.

American has positioned itself to take a new narrowbody aircraft every 10 days beginning next year and to begin a growth and replacement strategy with the 787 beginning in 2012 all in managing the company for the long term. Hopefully the APA might begin to take notice from visionary pilot groups at Delta and Northwest that tomorrow really is different.

As always, this one is fun to watch. I wanted to post a piece I have been working on about autos and airlines again, but news here is so hard to resist.

Wednesday
Sep172008

Olympic, Alitalia, American and the Wings Club

And we thought the last 10 days of news regarding financial institutions was interesting. In this industry we have legacy flag carriers dying on many continents. We have continued, and even aggressive, consolidation activity in Europe. In the US we have Delta and Northwest pointing to a date before year end to complete their deal. All that remains a constant, it seems, is the Allied Pilots Association creating press releases that ignore the realities of the world to virtually everyone except Lou Dobbs. But before we go there………

Today, Greece finally announced that it would shut down Olympic Airlines and start anew. The Greek flag carrier has only been going through gyrations of Olympic-sized restructuring efforts since I began to study the industry. Nearly 30 years later, its legacy carcass is finally put to rest.

All the while, the investor group that has been assembled in Italy to rescue Alitalia has given certain unions that have not signed on to their business plan until Thursday to do so. Today, a small union caused the carrier to cancel flights as it struck. The bankruptcy laws in Europe are different than in the US and honestly, they are the kind that should be adopted here. If the investor group were to walk away, there is a high probability that Alitalia could be liquidated. Not that Rome is burning, but maybe a “Flying Pig" Roast is in the offing.

Whereas saving Alitalia has become a front-burner issue for newly elected Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, Rome will not burn; Milan will not burn; and all other markets in Italy will not burn if flag carrier Alitalia does liquidate. The world really will not miss Alitalia. Just like the hub closures that have occurred in the US over the years, replacement capacity will be sure to find the market opportunities that are presented. Lufthansa and Air France and others have already identified markets where they will deploy capacity to address the void left by Alitalia should it exit the space.

So, two more carriers in Europe, each once proud flag carriers, are close to succumbing to the high cost of jet fuel, a slowing economy, a strengthening of the dollar, hyper-competition for traffic flows over European hubs/gateways and high intrinsic cost structures that simply cannot be supported.

Now we turn our attention to the US. Similar pressures are forcing its carriers to engage in gut-wrenching decisions of resizing networks in order to adapt to the new economic order. Leave it to the Allied Pilots Association to cause most interested observers of this industry to scratch our heads yet again. Not only did APA’s President write to the CEO’s of British Airways, Iberia, Finnair and Royal Jordanian advising them not to enter into an immunized alliance structure with American Airlines, they also wrote to the US Government urging them to postpone their review of the application.

When all other carriers, including Southwest, are actively seeking new revenue sources that can only work to bolster the bottom line, the APA continues to act in the most destructive of ways. The revenue sources its company is seeking to participate in are those carried by American’s competitors today. To ignore them only initiates American's walk down the path of Olympic, Alitalia, Sabena, and the many US carriers that have ultimately succumbed to the same fate.

But only APA’s membership can decide if they are being led for the better or ultimately to their detriment. I cannot answer that.

Finally, James Hogan, the Chief Executive of Ethiad, spoke to the Wings Club in New York about a 'New Wave' in Global Aviation. If anyone does not believe for a minute that this “new wave” coming from Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi will challenge the European partners of the US carriers in a big way, then you are just not reading the tea leaves.

There are traffic flows that are critical for American and British Airways to participate in that require competitive strength. There are possibilities for Iberia that do not exist today. Today, each of the carriers have a strong position in some markets. Absent a relationship similar to that of STAR and SkyTeam, oneworld’s global market position will only continue to erode and will result in less and less flying for US pilots working under the American Airlines’ seniority list.

Just look at the loss of legacy carrier employment in the US today. American has not suffered the half of what United, US Airways and others have suffered. There is no growth at home and that is precisely why APA’s actions of today just simply ignore the evolution of the global industry and the forces of a global economy. Tomorrow’s world is not about Abilene, it is about Asia. It is not about narrowbodies to Eugene, it is about widebodies to Europe. And it sure as hell is not about Midland/Odessa, it is about the Middle East.

It is also not about 12,000 American pilots that Captain Hill states he represents, it is about the other 65,000+ proud employees of American Airlines.

Thank god for Lee Moak and his counterparts at Northwest. At least they recognized that changes were needed to compete in tomorrow's marketplace.